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CONSTITUTIONAL NORM ENTREPRENEURING 
OREN TAMIR* 
 
Everyone is obsessed today with constitutional norms.  They have 
powerfully penetrated our vocabulary and are mentioned with dizzying 
frequency.  We now know that any account of our valuable constitutional 
practices cannot end with just politics or law and must also include norms.  
What is further unique about the current moment in our political era is that 
an important and increasingly growing subset of these norms appears to be 
exceedingly fragile and is under persistent attack.  Some even suggest that 
the erosion of constitutional norms is at the heart of a global trend of 
democratic recession.  But how precisely do constitutional norms change and 
ultimately collapse?  And is there something actors can do to influence these 
processes?   
This Article’s goal is to explore these questions, both in general and in 
the context of the alleged trend of democratic recession.  It argues that 
although constitutional norms can be understood, following H.L.A Hart, as 
a “primitive” component in our political systems (given the way they differ 
from formal law), constitutional norms can attain some of the credentials 
Hart believed could be attributed exclusively to law.  More specifically, the 
Article claims that we can fashion something akin to “rules of change” and 
“rules of adjudication” in relation to constitutional norms and accordingly 
gain a firmer grasp on how they develop, change, and ultimately break down 
and on how conflicts about constitutional norms are eventually resolved 
within our politics.  As for “rules of change” for norms, the Article argues 
that constitutional norms tend to change in predictable ways and because of 
the working of several distinctive mechanisms.  As for “rules of 
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adjudication” for norms, the Article identifies a set of concrete strategies that 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs—who wish to change present norms, 
including destroying them—and constitutional norm anti-preneurs—who 
wish to safeguard present norms—can use to try to manipulate constitutional 
norms to achieve their desired, and oppositional, ends.  
The Article concludes by implementing that framework to our present 
moment of democratic recession.  It asks, in other words, what constitutional 
norm anti-preneurs can do to halt further encroachment upon valuable 
constitutional norms that appear crucial to the resilience of democratic 
systems, both in general and in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE ASCENDENCY, IMPORTANCE, AND PRIMITIVENESS OF 
NORMS 
Turn back the clock fifteen, even ten years, and you will find little 
mention of the word “norms” in scholarship on public law and particularly 
scholarship on constitutional law.1  Today, however, everyone seems 
obsessed with constitutional norms or, more broadly, with the idea that much 
that is “constitutional” in our system is found in norms of political behavior—
those practices or rules of conduct that apply in the world of politics, are 
mostly informal in nature, and primarily enforced through political sanctions 
rather than law.2  
Perhaps this should not be surprising.  After all, ours is famously a 
written, so-called formal Constitution.  That Constitution may have been 
believed to contain within its four corners all that is necessary for 
constitutional government in the United States.  Most of the “interesting” 
scholarly work to be done on constitutionalism similarly seemed to call for 
engagement with that specific feature of our Constitution rather than with 
anything outside of the document itself or that is informal in nature.  
 
 1. The qualifiers of “public law” and “constitutional law” in the text are important since the 
topic of norms emphatically did draw significant attention from scholars of other fields of law well 
before it drew the focused attention of public law and ultimately constitutional law scholars.  See, 
e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
338, 339 (1997); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).  
 2. For various definitions of norms that public law scholars have found useful, see Keith E. 
Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1847, 1860 (2013); Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break 
Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1433–34 (2018) (supplying a survey of common definitions found 
in the literature).  For the definition of norms that I use throughout this Article, see infra Part II.B.  
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Constitutional informality even used to be derided in our system as “free-
floating.”3 
These assumptions are clearly no longer valid today.  Constitutional law 
scholars have now fully discovered the importance of informal constitutional 
norms.4  They have penetrated our contemporary constitutional vocabulary 
in an extremely powerful sense and are no longer recognized as something 
foreign, relevant only in other legal systems, which, unlike our own, lack a 
formal or a “master-text” Constitution.5  Among other things, norms are now 
recognized by scholars to play an important role in supplementing the written 
Constitution and as part of the “small-c” component that operates alongside 
it.6  Norms have been moreover identified as a source that judges draw from 
when interpreting or constructing the Constitution itself.7  And, most 
ambitiously perhaps, norms are also understood to potentially account for 
some changes in the Constitution, even though these “informal amendments” 
are achieved beyond the processes envisioned by Article V.8  
The last few years have seen a particular surge of interest in 
constitutional norms in our system.  Indeed, in many ways, what is unique 
about the present moment in history is not merely the appearance of norms 
on the radar of constitutional observers and scholars and the recognition of 
norms’ analytical indispensability.9  Rather, it is that an important subset of 
constitutional norms faces increased pressures and appears under direct 
 
 3. Excerpts from Questioning of Judge Bork by Senate Committee Chairman, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 16, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/16/us/excerpts-from-questioning-of-judge-
bork-by-senate-committee-chairman.html.  
 4. Or, perhaps more accurately, scholars have rediscovered them.  See Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1231 (2013) (suggesting that 
constitutional lawyers in the United States have recently rediscovered the phenomenon and that this 
may happen every other generation or so).  
 5. JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON LAW IN GENERAL 90 (2012).The 
British constitutional system is the primary example of a system lacking a formal Constitution.  See, 
e.g., Erin F. Delaney, Stability in Flexibility: A British Lens on Constitutional Success, in 
ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 393, 394 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds., 2016) 
(emphasizing the informality of the British constitution).   
 6. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 
414 (2007).  
 7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2019).  
 8. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical 
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929–32 (2007).  
 9. See Adam Gopnik, Norms and Cliffs in Trump’s America, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/norms-and-cliffs-in-trumps-america.  
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attack.10  Our age, in other words, is not only the age of norms but also, and 
more distinctively, the age of norm erosion. 
The presidency of Donald J. Trump did much to bring this to the fore.11  
To many, one of the defining features of Trump’s tenure (perhaps THE 
defining feature) was exactly its multiple and frequent instances of norm 
flouting.12  Trump, for his part, was powerfully accused of a series of 
violations of norms of political behavior that apply to the office of the 
presidency, such as in his decision not to release information about his 
business affairs, in his attempts to interfere with the integrity of the process 
of criminal investigations, in his approach to decision-making in the White 
House, and his rhetorical style most broadly.13  Yet Trump was far from being 
alone in breaking norms.  His opponents from within and outside the federal 
government also appear to have been engaged in breaking norms themselves, 
particularly by exercising myriad tactics of resistance that were thought of in 
the not-too-remote past as beyond the pale.14  
The reality wherein constitutional norms face severe pressures goes well 
beyond Trump’s presidency, however.  For quite some time now it has been 
commonplace to describe the behavior of political parties in our system as 
accompanied by persistent norm breaking.  Indeed, in recent years, both 
Republicans and Democrats have been systematically and increasingly 
accused of—or have accused the other side of—norm-shattering behavior.  
 
 10. See Brendan Nyhan, Norms Matter, POLITICO MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/why-norms-matter-politics-trump-215535.  
 11. See Peter Baker, For Trump, A Year of Reinventing the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/us/politics/trump-reinventing-presidency.html (“Mr. 
Trump is the 45th president of the United States, but he has spent much of his first year in office 
defying the conventions and norms established by the previous 44, and transforming the presidency 
in ways that were once unimaginable.”). 
 12. See Jon D. Michaels, The Safeguards of Our Constitutional Republic: An Introduction, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 1391 (2018).  This is a recurring topic of the LAWFARE blog and particularly 
Professor Jack Goldsmith’s writing in it and outside of it.  See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald 
Trump Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921/.  The issue 
moreover lies at the center of attention of another legal blog—JUST SECURITY—which actually 
operates what it calls a “Norms Watch” on the presidency of Trump.  See Katerina Wright, Norms 
Watch: Tracking Team Trump’s Breaches of Democratic Traditions, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36303/normalization-watch/. 
 13. For a useful survey of the various norm-shattering behaviors by former President Trump, 
see generally Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald 
Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 177–78 (2018).  Of course, Professor Siegel’s account is already dated—
as it hard to keep track of the issue and every day seems to bring with it new reports of President 
Trump’s norm breaking.  
 14. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant Disobedience, 94 U. CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 352–53 
(2019) (surveying instances of leaking and other disobedience strategies and framing them as norm 
breaching). 
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One specific context in which this has been manifested is that of legislative 
obstruction of appointments to the judiciary and the executive branch, 
particularly through the use of the Senate filibuster.15  But additional episodes 
of potential norm breaking by the political parties can also be identified, 
including in the events that characterized the debt ceiling crisis or the still 
recent occurrences of government shutdowns.16 And, so far at least, norm 
breaking seems to have survived Trump’s presidency and lingered well into 
the Biden presidency as well (though perhaps in a more civilized, less in-
your-face, form). 
The United States is far from being alone in this story.  Other political 
systems are also experiencing unique pressures on existing constitutional 
norms.  One prominent example of this is the United Kingdom, where the 
politics of implementing the referendum that determined that the United 
Kingdom would leave the European Union, Brexit, has led to what many 
informed observers characterized as a significant infringement of 
constitutional norms.17  But recent pressures on norms may be an even more 
global trend.  Indeed, a growing number of countries worldwide appear to be 
experiencing a process of “democratic backsliding”18 or “constitutional 
retrogression”19 in which their resilience as democratic systems—or their 
further progression toward democratic consolidation—no longer seems 
guaranteed. And the possibility of their becoming authoritarian appears 
plausible in ways not deemed possible before.  This is so much the case that 
some have concluded that we live in an age of global democratic decline or 
recession.20  Among the countries to have been identified as experiencing this 
trend are Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Brazil, along with the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  
 
 15. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for 
a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96 (2017); Neil S. Siegel, Law Is Not Enough, 45 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 197, 203–04 (2019). 
 16. See Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, 
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 503, 516–21 (2003); David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government 
Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 206 (2015). For the 
claim that there’s a difference in the degree of willingness of the respective parties to engage in 
norm flouting, see Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018). 
 17. See, e.g., Edward Evans & Jonathan Browning, How Brexit Has Unleashed a U.K. 
Constitutional Crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-
brexit-has-unleashed-a-uk-constitutional-crisis/2019/09/27/f363f54e-e138-11e9-be7f-
4cc85017c36f_story.html.  
 18. See Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 5 (2016). 
 19. See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 78, 83 (2018). 
 20. See Larry Diamond, Facing Up to Democratic Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 147 (2015).  
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Though it may still be too early to evaluate this phenomena of alleged 
global democratic decline in more definitive terms,21 many have come to 
believe that one important explanation for this observed worldwide 
development strongly relates to the collapse of essential constitutional norms.  
In this view, the problem at the heart of the alleged decline is not, or not 
solely, the usual obsession of constitutional lawyers and scholars—that is, 
the potential fragility of formal constitutional rules that regulate democratic 
politics and secure certain values and institutions we associate with liberal 
constitutionalism.  Rather, what ignites these processes is precisely the 
weakening of relevant informal constitutional norms that help legitimize and 
sustain important democratic institutions such as the press, civil society, and 
governmental bureaucracies, along with informal rules of political fair play.22  
As two leading advocates of this position put it, “[a] well-designed 
constitution is not enough to ensure a stable democracy . . . . Democratic 
institutions must be reinforced by strong informal norms [which] serve as the 
soft guardrails of democracy, preventing political competition from spiraling 
into a chaotic, no-holds-barred conflict.”23  
Despite their importance and salience in contemporary debates, we still 
seem to know relatively little about norms and particularly about 
constitutional norms.  They remain shrouded in “mystery.”24  One way to 
understand why is to recall H.L.A. Hart’s famous distinction between 
primitive societies and mature ones.   
For Hart, a primitive society is one that operates exclusively based on 
what he called “primary rules,” those that regulate human behavior directly 
and determine the dos and don’ts expected in a particular society.  In contrast, 
non-primitive or mature societies contain something more.  In addition to 
primary rules, these societies contain what Hart defined as “secondary rules,” 
those rules wherein “primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively 
determined.”25  In Hart’s view, only the latter type of societies can be mature.  
 
 21. See Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 1, 5 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) 
(raising the possibility that the trend is temporary rather than enduring). 
 22. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 105–06 (2018); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, From Doctrine to Safeguards in American Constitutional Democracy, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 1398, 1413 (2018); Samuel Issacharoff, Judicial Review in Troubled Times: 
Stabilizing Democracy in a Second-Best World, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2019). 
 23. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-
to-democracy.html; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 22, at 97–117. 
 24. C. J. G. Sampford, ‘Recognize and Declare’: An Australian Experiment in Codifying 
Constitutional Conventions, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 369, 374 (1987).  
 25. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994). 
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This is so because absent secondary rules—composed more specifically of 
“rule[s] of recognition,” “rules of change,” and “rules of . . . adjudication”—
and absent the institutions that control the implementation of these rules,26 no 
society can function in an orderly fashion.  
Constitutional norms seem exactly the kinds of rules that fit what Hart 
had in mind in describing a primitive system.  They govern what is and what 
is not allowed in politics, much akin to Hart’s primary rules.27  But they are 
not disciplined by any set of clear secondary rules that help in their 
recognition, in determining the instances in which they validly change, or in 
adjudicating disputes about them.  There is, moreover, no unique institutional 
apparatus that systematically addresses them as there is with law.  
This primitiveness of constitutional norms is surely part of the reason 
for these norms’ mysteriousness.  This primitive nature is also the source of 
many contemporary frustrations with the state of the literature and theory on 
constitutional and political norms, particularly today when many seem keen 
on finding ways to safeguard some valuable norms from further erosion to 
counter the alleged trend of democratic decline or constitutional 
retrogression.  Consider for instance Hart’s secondary rules of change and 
adjudication.  If constitutional politics had something like these kinds of rules 
for constitutional norms, that is—if there had been a certain predictable logic 
to how they change and ultimately collapse, and certain systemic pattern to 
how dispute about them are eventually resolved, then it might have been 
possible to call out more definitively those flouting norms and to contain 
processes of norm erosion.28  But, given their current nature as a primitive 
component in our systems—primitive law so to speak29—the hope of 
domesticating norms in this way seems futile. 
Or does it?  Could it be that constitutional norms are not as primitive as 
first meets the eye? And that we can have something akin to secondary rules 
that apply to them?  
 
 26. This specific addition might have been Joseph Raz’s who was correct in pointing out Hart’s 
insufficient attention to the institutional aspect of his theory and how secondary rules in essence 
assume an institutional apparatus.  See Joseph Raz, The Institutional Nature of Law, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 90–98 (1979); see also N. W. BARBER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 98 (2010). 
 27. For additional analogies between political and constitutional norms and Hartian primitive 
systems, see Sampford, supra note 24, at 390; BARBER, supra note 26, at 97–98; Leonid Sirota, 
Towards a Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conventions, 11 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 29 
(2011). 
28 Cf. ROSALIND DIXON & DAVID LANDAU, ABUSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWING 35 (2021) 
(discussing the need for, as well as challenges of, a “project of constitutional defense” for these 
times of potential constitutional abuse and retrogression). 
 29. Jeremy Bentham referred to customs as “traditionary law,” which for him was fitting merely 
for “barbarians.”  See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF THE LIMITS OF THE PENAL BRANCH OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 161–62 (Philip Schofield ed., 2010).  
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To be sure, previous literature has addressed the question captured by 
what we can understand as Hart’s rule of recognition when it tried to define 
more clearly what constitutional norms are.30  In addition, courts sometimes 
recognize constitutional norms and even enforce them during the proceedings 
conducted before them, as previous literature also amply documents.31  As a 
result, there is certainly a domain in which constitutional norms have 
secondary rules that apply to them—because they are simply immersed, 
within this domain, into standard, formal law.  But what about cases outside 
the domain of judicial recognition or enforcement of constitutional norms?  
Is it possible to offer an account of how these norms are changed or 
adjudicated in constitutional politics itself?  
This Article’s principal aim is to provide for the first time an affirmative 
response to these queries—to illustrate how constitutional norms can become 
less mysterious and acquire, to the extent possible and with appropriate 
modifications, some Hartian credentials.  In addition, this Article’s goal is to 
illustrate the analytical and pragmatic payoffs that making constitutional 
norms more mature in this way carries, both as a general matter and 
specifically for our age of norm erosion and democratic decline.  
My claim in this Article is threefold.  First, while constitutional norms 
certainly appear different from formal law, I argue that these norms tend to 
change in predictable patterns and that there are specific mechanisms that can 
systematically and effectively cause them to do so.  These mechanisms are 
what we could think of as rules of change for constitutional norms.  
Second, I argue that we can moreover identify the core strategies savvy 
constitutional stakeholders may employ to successfully influence or 
manipulate the content and shape of constitutional norms.  These strategies 
are something like rules of adjudication for constitutional norms because they 
suggest how actors can get norms to eventually land where they would want 
them to.  And as I show below, these strategies will largely differ between 
the type of actors that will make use of them.  On the one hand, some 
strategies will be relevant for the most part for what I will call constitutional 
norm entrepreneurs32 who seek to effect change in present constitutional 
norms, including destroying them.33  On the other hand, other strategies 
 
 30. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2, and discussion in Part I.B infra. 
 31. Compare Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 283, 284 (2015) 
(defending a minimal judicial role in relation to norms), with Farrah Ahmed, Richard Albert & 
Adam Perry, Judging Constitutional Conventions, INT’L J. CONST’L L. 787, 788 (2019) (defending 
a more robust judicial role), and Issacharoff, supra note 22 (similar). 
 32. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).  
 33. For this terminology, see Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 2. 
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would be of use primarily to what I will call constitutional norm anti-
preneurs34 who seek to safeguard present norms.  
Finally, my claim is that the general framework developed here can help 
us face our current moment of norm erosion.  Indeed, once we are equipped 
with these rules of change and rules of adjudication for constitutional norms, 
I will suggest that we can better see what constitutional norm anti-preneurs 
can do to halt further encroachment on valuable constitutional norms that 
appear crucial for the resilience of democratic systems.  
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I argues that in thinking about 
constitutional norms and what rules of change or rules of adjudication might 
apply to them, we should as a threshold matter focus mostly on evolutionary 
and incremental processes and that, contrary to what is a popular and intuitive 
view, constitutional norms don’t regularly burst like soap bubbles or “die” in 
a moment.   
Building on this, Part II then presents five mechanisms whereby 
constitutional norms change or ultimately expire in this evolutionary or 
incremental way.  These mechanisms—or rules of change for constitutional 
norms as I will also call them based on the Hartian metaphor—are (1) 
layering, (2) drift, (3) conversion, (4) displacement, and (5) exhaustion.  And 
Part II explains what each mechanism entails, as well as supplies a variety of 
motivating examples of each one’s workings that are drawn from the 
constitutional practices of various jurisdictions (in addition to the United 
States, also the United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel) and from different 
times (as far as the early Republic and as late as the first impeachment trial 
of former President Trump).  
Part III then moves to discuss the different strategies stakeholders can 
use to influence the content and shape of constitutional norms; what I will 
also call, following again H.L.A. Hart, their rules of adjudication.  For 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs, Part III discusses and illustrates the 
strategies of (1) subversive layering, (2) parasitical drift, (3) opportunistic 
conversion, (4) competitive displacement, and (5) insurrectionary 
exhaustion.  By contrast, for constitutional norm anti-preneurs, Part III 
identifies and exemplifies the strategies of (1) counter-layering, (2) politics 
of unfreezing, (3) politics of fidelity, (4) sheltering, (5) blaming, demonizing 
and valorizing, and over framing, (6) formalization, and (7) memory 
entrepreneuring.  
Part IV finally implements this framework to our age of democratic 
decline or constitutional retrogression.  First, I outline how constitutional 
 
 34. I borrow this term from Alan Bloomfield, Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to 
Normative Change, 42 REV. INT’L. STUD. 310 (2015). 
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norm anti-preneurs who are troubled by the risks of democratic recession due 
to norm erosion may be able to contain those risks by playing defense.  As 
Part IV explains, this largely includes (1) strict and unrelenting adherence to 
the relevant constitutional norms and (2) resorting to what Part IV will call, 
drawing on customary international law, a “rhetoric of containment.”  Part 
IV ends, however, with skepticism that playing defense vis-à-vis 
constitutional norms is appropriate in circumstances such as those that 
characterize our own system in the United States.  As I discuss below, it may 
be that the best approach here is altogether different.  Rather than defensively 
adhering to constitutional norms, the most sensible approach to defend norms 
may actually be playing offense, which largely calls for active shattering of 
present constitutional norms.   
Two preliminary notes are in order before I proceed to the argument.  
First, a note on terminology. In previous scholarship dealing with 
constitutional norms, these norms are occasionally called “conventions,” 
which is a term that originates from legal theory in commonwealth systems.35  
Given, however, that the term “convention” creates confusion with bodies 
like the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 and since here in the 
United States it appears that the term “norms” has become more common 
(especially in the context of debates revolving around constitutional and 
democratic decline and resilience),36 I employ the term norms here as well.  
Second, a note on scope: The Article’s focus is on constitutional norms, 
which is only a subset of the broader class of political norms that exist in 
our—and indeed any other—system at any given time.37  However, I do not 
deny that many of my claims or the mechanisms that I identify throughout 
this Article are applicable to this broader setting and may include all political 
norms.  Indeed, I think it is very likely the case and on occasion I will refer 
to political norms as such.  Nonetheless, to make the discussion in the Article 
more tractable, I leave the larger class of political norms mostly to the side 
and restrict my focus primarily to the subclass of constitutional norms. 
 
 35. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 4; Whittington, supra note 2. 
 36. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2243 
(2018); Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 2. 
 37. To be sure, there is a question regarding how exactly to define constitutional norms, where 
some take a rather limited view where others take a more capacious one.  For a recent treatment, 
see Ashraf Ahmed, A Theory of Constitutional Norms, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3710601.  Though my own view is that the 
appropriate definition should be quite capacious, compare Mark Tushnet, Is Congress Capable of 
Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional Interpretation? Some Notes on Congressional Capacity 
to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499 (2009), from the point of view of my claims here, 
the precise definition is irrelevant.  The theory I develop applies with equal force to any of the views 
regarding what qualifies as an appropriately “constitutional” norm. 
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I. DO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS BURST LIKE BUBBLES (REGULARLY)? 
My aim in this Article is to demystify constitutional norms. I want to 
show that they are less mysterious than first meets the eye, to identify the 
logic through which they develop, change, and ultimately collapse, and to 
spotlight what different actors might be able to do with constitutional norms 
to achieve their desired ends—whether it is to defend norms or to change and 
destroy them.38  In attempting to do exactly that, a threshold question presents 
itself, however: Should we focus mostly on revolutionary or evolutionary 
processes?  Do constitutional norms change in a moment—like, as we will 
soon see, a soap bubble that all of the sudden bursts? Or do constitutional 
norms change through a more evolutionary and incremental process, that is 
completed only with the passage of time?  
This Part first shows why this threshold question is relevant in the 
context of norms and why we rarely ask these questions in relation to formal 
law.  It then argues that the more accurate perspective in relation to norms is 
the evolutionary one.  While it is certainly possible that norms in general and 
constitutional norms in particular will change and even disappear in a 
moment, this is a much less likely process compared to a more stretched-out 
one. When we try and think about the various secondary rules that apply to 
constitutional norms—which is the focus of the lion’s share of this Article—
we should therefore take this evolutionary perspective mostly in mind. 
A. Laws, Norms, and Soap Bubbles 
Legal rules are constantly infringed upon or ignored.  Law-breaking, in 
other words, is just part of our everyday life.  But here’s the thing to notice: 
While law breaking is persistent, we do not typically think of any specific 
breach or incompliance with legal rules as detrimental to their validity or 
existence.  Legal breaches, as such, are not normally considered “existential.”  
The reason is, of course, and drawing also on H.L.A. Hart’s 
contributions to legal theory, that law is an institutionalized system of rules 
that has internalized secondary rules about the ways in which primary rules 
are recognized, validly changed, and adjudicated.  The meaning of each 
breach or noncompliance with primary legal rules is therefore not determined 
in isolation.  Rather, that meaning depends on the way the relevant legal 
institutions—usually courts, but not necessarily so—end up treating these 
 
 38. Cf. JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà 
eds., 2d ed. 1975). 
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breaches; or, in other words, on how breaches are ultimately “filtered 
through” these institutions.39  
Even when a perceived breach of the law is not actually “filtered 
through” the relevant legal institutions in this way, however, that mere fact 
is not itself considered as affecting the legal rules that were involved.  After 
all, every system of legal institutions is imperfect and has limited capacity.40  
It cannot cover each instance of breach.  In those circumstances, what we 
may think of as “unattended breaches” can be easily rationalized due to the 
system’s imperfections.  We can reasonably say, in other words, that had the 
system not been limited in its capacity to address the relevant breach, it would 
have been handled in the presumed way that similar breaches, which were so 
enforced, would have been handled.  The mere existence of legal institutions 
and the acknowledgment that they have secondary rules allow us to easily 
explain away these scenarios.41  
Things will be different in relation to norms.  These norms are not 
similarly institutionalized the way “normal” legal rules are.  They are 
typically the result of more decentralized and diffuse political or social 
processes.42  More often than not, they lack any institution with the authority 
to determine their meaning and scope, and to decide whether sanctions should 
apply.43  We simply expect that norms will be enforced through political or 
societal sanctions, or even by the sheer power of self-interest.44  Indeed, this 
 
 39. In some cases, the relevant institutions might determine that the behavior in question was 
indeed a violation of applicable legal rules, and appropriate sanctions will follow.  In other cases, 
the same institutions might end up rationalizing the behavior as “non-breach” by determining that 
it, in fact, falls within the scope of permissible legal behavior, by classifying it as a permissible 
change in the governing legal rule or by any other rationalization the currently internalized system 
of “secondary rules” permits. 
 40. For the influence of limited capacity of the United States Supreme court on judicial doctrine 
in the field of constitutional law, see generally ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: 
HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019). 
 41. Especially if the cases are “easy cases.”  See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 399, 407 (1985).  Of course, how much “easy cases” precisely exist and what makes cases 
“easy” is a disputed subject.  See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in 
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 687, 688 & n.24, 689 (1985). 
 42. See, e.g., Cristina Bicchieri et al., Social Norms, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2018), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms (highlighting that norms arise as 
“the unplanned result of individuals’ interaction”). 
 43. See BARBER, supra note 26, at 96–103 (discussing the possibility of institutions that do in 
fact enforce constitutional norms, though recognizing that this is usually an exceptional state rather 
than the rule); see also Adam Perry & Adam Tucker, Top-Down Constitutional Conventions, 81 
MOD. L. REV. 765 (2018). 
 44. For the role of political and social sanctions, see Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1182, and for 
self-interest, see id. at 1186–89.  
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is precisely what makes norms, as discussed before,45 and following H.L.A. 
Hart, a primitive component in our political and constitutional systems.  
Consequently, and in contrast to law, it is possible that any perceived 
breach of a norm could have by itself a “destructive effect”46 on its existence.  
Because there is no defined set of institutions where norms are expected to 
be “filtered through” and no clear secondary rules, the mere fact that a breach 
has occurred, and that the relevant societal behavior has simply been altered, 
can bring about a norm’s demise.  We moreover cannot easily explain away 
nonenforcement of norms the same way we can treat nonenforcement of legal 
rules.  
Against this backdrop, it is understandable why many seem to think that 
norms are incredibly fragile, much more so than laws.  As Jon Elster puts it: 
if breached, norms may simply burst all of the sudden—like soap bubbles.47  
Or, in yet another memorable phrasing, norms can disappear “almost at a 
touch.”48 
This moves too quickly, however.  We know, for example, that not 
every breach of an alleged norm necessarily leads to the norm’s demise.  
Sometimes what appears to be a breach of a norm is exposed shortly 
thereafter to relevant sanctions or does not cause any durable behavioral 
change.  In such cases, the norm remains intact despite its breach.49  
The precise effects of a breach of a norm become even further 
ambiguous if we consider a longer time horizon than simply observing the 
immediate moment of the alleged breach and what happens in its immediate 
aftermath.  Consider the familiar case of the alleged constitutional norm that 
used to exist in the United States and precluded a president from serving in 
office for more than two terms (before the introduction of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment).  On one popular view, FDR’s third and fourth terms were a 
breach of this constitutional norm.50  But, given that the Twenty-Second 
Amendment has since disallowed more than two terms, and because that 
 
 45. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 46. COLIN R. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (2d ed. 1999). 
 47. Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms 24 (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://perma.cc/YPN8-764G.  
 48. H. W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 207 (1925); see also 
Stephen J. Majeski, Comment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of 
Norms, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 278 (Karen S. Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990) (noting 
that “[n]orms often behave in quite nonevolutionary ways.  Norms can arise and also be destroyed 
very quickly in a given social context”). 
 49. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1201 (discussing how the norm against presidential 
removal of U.S. attorneys was breached during President George W. Bush’s administration but 
seemed to have been restored after significant political blowback). 
 50. See Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in 
Established Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37, 44 (2012). 
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amendment was advanced very much with FDR’s four presidential terms in 
mind,51 it could be said that the breach actually contributed to the 
reinstatement of the previous norm and even strengthened it.52  Indeed, much 
as the institutions of law take time to adjudicate and “filter” relevant disputes 
or alleged breaches, so too do the more decentralized forces of politics that 
operated to rectify FDR’s breach of the no-more-than-two-terms norm.  And 
just as we do not say that during the time in which the institutions of law are 
sorting out the relevant dispute, the law is invalid or that it bursts like a 
bubble, there is no reason this may not be true in relation to norms such as 
the one FDR’s conduct breached.53  
Another reading of this historical episode reveals a further complication 
with the image of norms’ inevitable fragility and the immediate risk of bubble 
bursting.  On this alternative reading, FDR’s third and fourth terms in office 
did not amount to a breach of the constitutional norm against more than two 
terms.  Rather, they created a valid exception to that norm in cases of exigent 
circumstances, as was true at the time given the prospect of United States 
involvement in World War II, among other things.54  On this interpretation, 
then, what may have been perceived as a breach was actually a change in the 
constitutional norm’s content—from a crisp and bounded norm that prohibits 
more than two terms across the board to a norm that includes a qualification 
that applies in exceptional circumstances.  In this view, moreover, what 
changed the relevant informal constitutional norm was not FDR, but rather 
the Twenty-Second Amendment.55  
As these examples suggest, the relation between an apparent breach of 
a norm and the norm’s continued existence is more complex than what we 
may otherwise infer from the bubble-bursting picture depicted above.  Norms 
can prove to be rather resilient, both in general but especially once we adopt 
a longer time horizon.  The connection between a breach and the particular 
result of a norm’s ultimate demise is also more tenuous.  What is perceived 
as a breach could, in fact, be a transformation in the content of the norm, 
perhaps even a subtle one.  
 
 51. See generally MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 
POWER, PRINCIPLES & POLITICS 124–43 (2011). 
 52. See Azari & Smith, supra note 50, at 44.  
 53. I note that the example is somewhat imperfect because the norm has been replaced by a 
formal legal provision rather than a pure restoration of the informal norm.  The reason this example 
does partially work well is because formal law functions here as a social sanction for the violation 
of a norm.  
 54. See Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional Convention, 19 LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 
(1999). 
 55. At least to the extent that we understand it to forbid more than two terms even in exceptional 
circumstances.  See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319 
(2009). 
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As the remainder of this Part argues, there are good reasons to think that 
in relation to norms generally and constitutional norms particularly, bubble 
bursting is not at all a frequent occurrence.  Instead of a scenario in which 
norms suddenly burst, or “disappear at a touch,” the more common scenario 
for norms’ change and ultimate demise is one that entails a gradual or 
incremental process.  
B. Norms and Politics 
The first reason to believe this is the case relates to the very nature of 
norms along with their interaction with the structure of politics.  
1. The Stickiness of Norms and Critical Junctures  
When we talk about a norm, we usually refer to a practice that had been 
meaningfully internalized by the various participants in it and that constrains 
them from pursuing alternative courses of action.  Of course, the relevant 
internalization may sometimes be “thin” rather than “thick.”  Norms are 
internalized in a thin sense when they are followed by the mere concern of 
avoiding sanctions due to what will be perceived as the norms’ breach or 
from sheer self-interest of losing the benefit of shared cooperative 
arrangements.  Conversely, norms are internalized in a thick sense when they 
become so embedded within their adherents that they may actually not 
recognize any alternative path of conduct but the one the norms dictate.56  
Norms backed by thin internalization are obviously much more fragile than 
are those that are thickly internalized.  
Nonetheless, even if norms are only thinly internalized, that thinness 
must still mean something more than a practice that allows every participant 
to defect when the rational cost-benefit calculation points in the right 
direction or when the relevant participant has concluded that the norm is no 
longer appealing or merely because of the “usefulness of the moment.”57  A 
norm exists only when this sort of rational calculation or normative 
contestation about the validity of the norm is constrained to a not insignificant 
degree.  With norms, moreover, that constraint has a particular structure: it 
stems from the fact that the relevant agent believes that others believe in the 
norm, will abide by it, and may potentially penalize what they perceive as a 
 
 56. For the distinction between thin and thick norms, see Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1184–86.  
A useful illustration of what thick internalization of norms entails, provided by Professor Ernest 
Young, is drawn from Moliere, whose fellow bourgeois gentlemen were so used to how he spoke 
that they did not realize that it was prose.  See Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: 
Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 535, 563 (2016) (quoting MOLIERE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, act 2, sc. 4).  
 57. HORWILL, supra note 48, at 206.  
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breach.  Indeed, only in these cases do norms have what may be referred to 
as causal efficacy.58  And only in such instances do norms become an 
interesting phenomenon in their own right, as it makes them different from, 
on the one hand, mere politics—which is more open to immediate rational 
calculation and normative contestation—and, on the other hand, regular 
law—which is constraining given its formalization and institutionalization.59  
Once we have this view of norms in hand, it becomes easy to see why 
they should generally prove resilient rather than burst like soap bubbles.  
After all, people do not normally change their beliefs so readily, including 
beliefs about what other people themselves believe.60  Their preferences may 
prove sticky as well—especially if they are prone to what behavioralists 
speak of under the umbrella term of status quo bias.61  When norms have 
some benefit for the participants, we would, in the normal course of events, 
expect this benefit to endure for at least some time; “negative feedback” 
usually takes some time to actually arise. And, even when it does, the returns 
are not immediately so significant as to decisively eliminate any value from 
the relevant norms.62   
Norms in general and constitutional norms in particular are furthermore 
embedded in a more complicated “political regime” or a constitutional order 
that exists in each political system.63  This regime, if robust, will generally 
 
 58. Elster, supra note 47, at 36, distinguishes three mechanisms that give norms causal efficacy: 
coordination, cooperation, and social sanctions.  
 59. For norms as this kind of “third bound” in between law and politics, see generally Adrian 
Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949 (2016). 
 60. Especially if they have a “high threshold[]” of tolerance and when they are placed in an 
environment of similarly tolerant individuals.  See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of 
Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOCIO. 1420, 1422 (1978).  For a helpful discussion, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, #MeToo as a Revolutionary Cascade (Nov. 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280325.   
 61. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).  In addition, research in the social sciences has uncovered that 
norms might stick even when they’re no longer truly held by their adherents.  This phenomenon is 
also known as the “conservative lag.”  See James M. Fields & Howard Schuman, Public Beliefs 
About the Beliefs of the Public, 40 PUB. OP. Q. 427, 446 (1976); Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. 
Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 
541, 543 (1994). 
 62. For the idea of “negative [policy] feedback[s]” in legal scholarship, see Daryl J. Levinson, 
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
657, 681–97, 744 (2011) (emphasis omitted).  
 63. A political regime is composed of “the commitments of ideology and interest embodied in 
preexisting institutional arrangements.”  See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS 
MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 34 (1993).  For other similar definitions, 
see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, 36 INT’L. ORG. 185, 186 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional 
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 31–32 (1999). 
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prove resilient to some kind of unraveling of norms.  It will contain within it 
resources to prevent the potential unraveling.64  
For these reasons, observing something that appears like bubble 
bursting should potentially lead us to suspect whether the previous practice 
that just burst was truly a norm in the relevant sense.  Perhaps it was only a 
“myth” rather than a practice that crystallized into a fully formed norm.65  
Alternatively, it might have been an “anticipatory”66 norm—a practice that 
had been in the process of crystallizing into a causally effective norm but that 
ultimately failed to come full circle and reach the requisite level of thin or 
thick internalization.67  
In light of what we can describe as their relative stickiness, robustness, 
or “[p]ersistence,”68 political norms and certainly constitutional norms’ more 
radical and rapid transformation that ultimately leads to their demise will 
likely result from more extreme shifts in the context and environment within 
which norms operate rather than as sudden bubble-bursting in the normal 
course of politics.  These kinds of changes, sometimes referred to in political 
science literature as “critical junctures,” can be quite dramatic, and may 
include wars, emergencies, other significant political crises, and, most 
importantly for present purposes, a change of political regimes.69  What 
makes norms particularly fragile during such events is that they disrupt the 
conditions that make them causally effective.  Indeed, critical junctures 
operate on a large scale to change, or at least soften, people’s beliefs and 
preferences, to unsettle the benefits and returns that previously established 
practices and institutions entailed, and to redefine the realm of possibilities 
that people see before them.  
 
 64. In political terms, this is because political regimes get “thickened”—people who are 
committed to this regime populate key positions within it that, in turn, enable them to fight-off or 
resist the collapse of relevant norms or rules affiliated with the regime.  See SKOWRONEK, supra 
note 63, at 15.  On a more conceptual level, writers have emphasized the ability of systems such as 
political regimes to “balance” themselves in myriad ways.  See generally Adrian Vermeule, 
Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 6 (2009). 
 65. Elster, supra note 47, at 28. 
 66. Eric Colvin, Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Canada, 4 SUP. CT. L. 
REV. 3, 15 (1982); see also Aileen McHarg, Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, 
Convention, Soft Law, 71 MOD. L. REV. 853, 858 (2008) 
 67. A different term may be norm in statu nascendi.  See Elster, supra note 47, at 35. 
 68. H. Peyton Young, The Evolution of Social Norms, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 359, 363 (2015). 
 69. A leading discussion of the concept of “critical junctures” is Giovanni Capoccia & R. 
Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in 
Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL. 341, 341 (2007).  Other familiar terms that are used in 
the literature in economics and political science and which convey similar meanings are “punctuated 
equilibrium,” “environmental jolts,” and “external shocks.”  
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As should be clear, critical junctures of this sort are rather infrequent, at 
least in established or stable political systems.70  Accordingly, in the normal 
course of events, we should not expect established norms—and especially 
established constitutional norms—to burst like bubbles. 
2. The “Stretched-Out” Nature of Critical Junctures 
But what if the moments in which we primarily care about the resilience 
of norms land precisely during such critical junctures? And what if this is 
where we are today? 
The examples mentioned in the Introduction, drawn from contemporary 
politics at home and around the world, appear to suggest exactly that. The 
politics of Brexit in the United Kingdom are what many describe as a political 
crisis or, if crisis is too strong, a unique juncture in the political life of the 
United Kingdom.71  The same applies to the United States.  The events that 
surrounded Donald Trump’s presidency and the behaviors of political parties 
up until today and which bring to the fore claims of norm infringement and 
destruction do not seem like politics “as usual” either.  Rather, they may be 
a symptom of a more fundamental shift or “crisis” in constitutional politics 
in the United States.72  And similar terms have been used to describe those 
countries that have been allegedly experiencing constitutional retrogression 
or democratic backsliding, such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.73  Perhaps, 
then, the bubble-bursting scenario has more purchase than what the previous 
discussion suggests, at least in the times that we’re living in today.  
Characterizations in this vein of contemporary politics in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, are largely convincing.  We 
may be living in an age of critical junctures in politics across the world.74  At 
the same time, there remain reasons to be skeptical that the relevant norms 
that apply will simply burst like bubbles even in times in which politics is 
during a genuine critical juncture.  
 
 70. One support for this claim originates from the sense of wrongness that accompanies claims 
that exist in established democracies that emergencies arise too frequently.  For work that captures 
this sense of concern, see, for example, Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J. 
F. 590 (2020).  
 71. See, e.g., Vernon Bogdanor, Britain’s Crisis isn’t Constitutional. It’s Political, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Apr. 1, 2019, 3:51 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/01/britains-crisis-isnt-
constitutional-its-political-brexit-tories-theresa-may-corbyn-customs-union-eu/.  
 72. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 157–
60 (2017). 
 73. See GRABER, LEVINSON & TUSHNET, supra note 21.  
 74. See generally Anna Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, A Third Wave of Autocratization Is 
Here: What Is New About It?, 26 DEMOCRATIZATION 1095 (2019). 
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The reason for this is simple. The description of “dramatic”75 or radical, 
often attached to events identified as critical junctures, sometimes leads to 
the impression that these junctures are always condensed and short, as if they 
happen in a heartbeat.  In many cases, however, this impression is misguided, 
and the period described as a critical juncture is quite extended.   
This is particularly the case outside the context of war or specific 
emergencies.76  The period in which one political regime ends and is replaced 
by another could be quite prolonged.77  In our system in the United States, 
one such case is the transformation from the New Deal regime to the “Reagan 
Revolution”—which, according to some accounts, took more than ten 
years.78  More relevant, the political crisis that characterizes the American 
political system today seems similarly extended, stretching perhaps also for 
a period of close to now more than ten years.79   
Even more broadly, and beyond the United States, one finding of the 
literature that travels under the broad umbrella of constitutional retrogression 
is that even political regime transitions are today becoming increasingly 
stretched in time.  Instead of “authoritarian reversion[s]” that occur through 
swift, and usually violent, coups, a slower and more extended process of 
transition is becoming much more common, in which regimes that were once 
relatively stable constitutional democracies—or in the process of such 
consolidation—are reversing course and becoming deconsolidated.80 
This “stretching” of critical junctures, both as a general matter and 
uniquely today, suggests yet again that norms may prove more resilient than 
previously thought.  Rather than experiencing a bubble-bursting moment, 
these norms will more likely gradually evolve until the relevant uncertainties 
that accompany stretched events of this type are ultimately resolved.  
 
 75. See Capoccia & Kelemen, supra note 69, at 341.  
 76. And even then, as emergencies today themselves tend to be quite extended, and so do wars.  
Consider, for example, the term “endless war” (or “forever war”) that has now become common to 
describe our contemporary era in which “‘peace’ coexists uncomfortably with interminable global 
violence.”  Samuel Moyn, Endless War Watch, Summer 2016, LAWFARE (June 24, 2016, 11:28 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/endless-war-watch-summer-2016.  
 77. For the emphasis on how transitions in politics tend to be more stretched out, see Karen 
Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review 
of Literature on the 1940s, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 689, 698–99 (1998); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional 
Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 549 (2004).  
 78. For an influential account, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL (2008). And for the source coining 
the term, see ROWLAND EVANS & ROBERT NOVAK, THE REAGAN REVOLUTION (1981). 
 79. See Balkin, supra note 72, at 157–58. 
 80. See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 108–10; Bermeo, supra note 18; DAVID RUNCIMAN, 
HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS 4 (2018). 
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3. Cyclical Norms (Or: Norms that Make A Comeback) 
Even at the point at which political transitions end and we are no longer 
in a so-called “critical juncture,” the disappearance or demise of preexisting 
constitutional norms is not entirely guaranteed. Norms that were under strain 
might ultimately make a comeback once the political transition—or the 
critical juncture—has concluded.  
There are two primary options that we must consider in this context. The 
first is that the new political regime established at the end of the relevant 
critical juncture will choose to retain the previous constitutional norms. By 
contrast, another option is that the choices the new political regime faces at 
the end of the transition will be limited, and it will have to work with the 
constitutional norms currently in force rather than act to abolish them 
entirely.  
This seems particularly likely in relation to constitutional norms that are 
more procedural in nature rather than substantive, namely norms that regulate 
the processes and institutions of political decision-making rather than 
politics’ ultimate goals.81  While constitutional norms of the latter kind may 
conflict directly with the ideological commitments or interests of a particular 
political regime and the policies it seeks to advance, the former types of 
norms may not be similarly oppositional.  Any political regime can achieve 
its substantive commitments through various procedural and institutional 
configurations, including the procedures that served the previous governing 
political regime.  These process norms may even prove conducive to a 
political regime’s own desired programs; they may stem from its more 
substantive commitments and norms, such as when a political regime—and 
the political leaders affiliated with it—is committed to the kinds of process 
norms that characterize a liberal democratic system.82  
Of course, as I previously said, the resilience of these process 
constitutional norms may not appear during the period of political transition 
itself.  After all, to take place, the transition may actually require those who 
 
 81. Different scholars emphasize different kinds of constitutional norms.  Jon Elster, for 
instance, focuses almost exclusively on constitutional norms that deal with “machinery of 
government.”  See Elster, supra note 47, at 21.  In contrast, other authors focus on more substantive 
political norms.  See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 703, 706 (1975); Young, supra note 6; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012). 
 82. The definition of a liberal democratic system is obviously contested.  For one form of 
definition, minimal in nature, which fits with the argument in the text, see Huq & Ginsburg, supra 
note 19, at 86–92, and see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND 
OPPOSITION (1971). 
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are leading the ascendant regime to play “hardball,”83 which involves either 
breaking or at least ignoring certain norms that have been operating as a 
means of blocking the potential for any significant political or regime change.  
However, once the political transition is more or less complete,84 the relevant 
process norms will be reestablished and will have many, though not 
necessarily all, of the characteristics that they had before the transition.85  The 
breach of these process norms has been found, in other words, to be only 
temporary, as if they were put “on hold.” These norms have a kind of cyclical 
nature. 
This dynamic is far from merely theoretical. It is evident from the 
history of political transitions, at least in established democracies.  For 
instance, though the United States has seen in the past century important 
political regime transitions, such as between the Gilded Age and the New 
Deal and then between the New Deal/Great Society86 regime and the “Reagan 
Revolution,”87 and although each of these transitions was accompanied by 
the repudiation of some of the more substantive norms associated with the 
previous regime, such as in relation to the nature and extent of government 
regulation and involvement in the economy, many of the process norms 
remained more or less intact at the end of those transitions—like norms about 
independent judicial review and independent civil service.88  Similarly, the 
United Kingdom has also experienced important political regime 
transitions—for example, between the “postwar consensus” and the changes 
ushered in by the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher.89  This 
transition certainly entailed the wholesale repudiation of many substantive 
norms about the role of government in the economy and the society, very 
 
 83. See Tushnet, supra note 77; Mark Tushnet, 1937 Redux? Reflections on Constitutional 
Development and Political Structures, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1103 (2012). 
 84. Though the completion of regime change seems like an impossible feat, given the reality of 
sedimentation.  See, e.g., Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: 
Theory Building in the Fullness of Time, 38 NOMOS: POL. ORD. 111 (1996). 
 85. In that sense, process norms are somewhat “cyclical.”  For an influential account that 
provides some motivation for why these kinds of process norms have this pull and are henceforth 
cyclical, see Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997).   
 86. See Jack Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the Cycles of Constitutional 
Time, 94 IND. L.J. 253, 293–95 (2019).  
 87. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND 
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 424 (1973). 
 88. See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 78. 
 89. For leading scholarly treatments of this transition, see, for example, DENNIS KAVANAGH & 
PETER MORRIS, CONSENSUS POLITICS: FROM ATLEE TO MAJOR (2d ed. 1994); DAVID DUTTON, 
BRITISH POLITICS SINCE 1945: THE RISE, FALL, AND REBIRTH OF CONSENSUS (1997).  For critique 
of the term “postwar consensus,” see, for example, Peter Kerr, The Postwar Consensus: A Woozle 
that Wasn’t?, in POSTWAR BRITISH POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE 74 (David Marsh et al. eds., 1999).  
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much like the parallel transition in the United States between the New 
Deal/Great Society and the Reagan era.  By the end of the transition, 
however, many important process norms remained intact, or were reinstalled, 
in terms of important details.90  
To be sure, the specter of constitutional retrogression or democratic 
decline that is a feature of our time suggests that the distinction between 
process and substance norms is fragile.  As indicated in the Introduction,91 
part of the reason for the alleged decline may be the more permanent, rather 
than temporary, unraveling of process norms—regarding, for instance, the 
rules of political fair play or norms of respect given to important democratic 
institutions.  Taken seriously, this claim suggests that we can no longer 
assume, as we might have previously, that political regime transitions, even 
in consolidated democracies, will remain within the larger project of 
democratic liberal constitutionalism. And that important democratic and 
constitutional process norms will ultimately make a comeback, or 
demonstrate cyclicality, after playing “hardball” will no longer be necessary.  
Note, though, that the literature discussing the establishment of more 
“hybrid regimes” suggests that the distinction between substantive and 
process norms carries weight even today and even considering the threat of 
constitutional retrogression.  In a nutshell, what that literature shows is that 
even political rulers who are reasonably suspected of having authoritarian 
ambitions—and who are hostile to relevant democratic and constitutional 
process norms—face difficulties in transitioning their political systems into 
something we might describe as full-blown authoritarian systems.92  A 
“hybrid” system that retains some core democratic features and some 
democratic process norms regarding the conduct of elections, among other 
things, is all these rulers are often able to achieve.93  
In the eyes of those currently troubled by what seems like a global trend 
of democratic decline or constitutional retrogression, this is clearly not 
terribly reassuring.  As my principal interest at this stage is directed at 
challenging the image of bubble-bursting as applied to norms, what matters 
for present purposes is the more general point: that the occurrence of critical 
 
 90. According to one commentator, for example, the Thatcher years can only be described as 
causing “fluctuations” in the U.K. constitutional norm of civil service independence.  See JEFF 
KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 224 (2012). 
 91. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 92. See generally Larry Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 21 
(2002); STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID 
REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010).  
 93. In addition to the sources cited supra note 92, see ANDREAS SCHENDLER, THE POLITICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY: SUSTAINING AND SUBVERTING ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM (2013), arguing 
that conducting multiparty elections has become an established norm even in authoritarian regimes. 
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junctures and the existence of political regime change may not necessarily 
entail the wholesale collapse of norms (I address the concerns underlying 
democratic decline or constitutional retrogression directly in Part IV of the 
Article).  
C. Varieties of Norms: Rule-Like/Standard-Like Norms 
My discussion up to this point has offered several reasons for thinking 
that norms, and particularly constitutional norms, will prove relatively 
resilient, more so than what the analogy to soap bubbles that all of the sudden 
burst suggests.  These reasons were primarily related to the essence of norms 
and the structure of constitutional politics.  There is, however, another reason 
for this conclusion, which concerns the specific content or form these norms 
might encompass. After all, norms do not appear in our political systems in 
just one variety.  The distinction previously discussed94 between substantive 
and process norms highlights one dimension along which norms can be 
distinguished from one another.  Another such dimension speaks to their 
specificity or level of abstraction.  Some norms can be quite specific in their 
content—as they anticipate a particular kind of behavior.  Other norms, in 
contrast, are more plastic and flexible.  
Indeed, as in law, norms can appear either in a rule-like form or in a 
standard-like form variety.95  In the international relations literature that 
addresses norms of international affairs, a similar distinction exists. On the 
one hand, this literature has identified what it calls “meta norms,”96 “principle 
norms,”97 or even “foundational norms,”98 which would correlate to what we 
think of in law as standards.  Much like legal standards, these norms often 
allow a broad range of acceptable applications or appropriate variations and 
may set only “overarching duties of conduct in order to provide or uphold 
them across issue areas, but are not necessarily operationalized, or applied to 
any specific behaviors, until the problem is clearly defined.”99  On the other 
 
 94. See supra Part I.D. 
 95. See Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 2, at 1437–38 (analogizing constitutional norms to rules 
and standards as they are conceived in law).  For the now classic discussion of rules and standards 
in law, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22 (1992) and Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992). 
 96. ANTJE WIENER, A THEORY OF CONTESTATION 10 (2014). 
 97. Alexander Betts & Philip C. Orchard, Introduction: The Normative Institutionalization-
Implementation Gap, in IMPLEMENTATION AND WORLD POLITICS: HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
CHANGE PRACTICE 9–10 (Alexander Betts & Philip C. Orchard eds., 2014). 
 98. WAYNE SANDHOLTZ, PROHIBITING PLUNDER: HOW NORMS CHANGE 21–22 (2007).  
 99. Carla Winston, Norm Structure, Diffusion, and Evolution: A Conceptual Approach, 24 EUR. 
J. INT’L REL. 638, 656 n.2 (2018).  For examples of these types of norms, consider the convention 
about “the “loyal opposition” in Westminster systems (which regulates the expected conduct 
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hand, there are also “policy norms,” which are much more specific and 
similar to legal rules.100  
Whether we stick with terms familiar to legal scholars or adopt the ones 
international relations scholarship uses, the different content of norms has an 
obvious implication for the forms through which norms change.  Norms of 
the more strict and narrow type are much more exposed to the risk of bubble 
bursting whereas norms that are more expansive and broader seem less so, 
given how they can be squared with a wide variety of behaviors.  
* * * 
To conclude this Part: for reasons related to the nature of norms, the 
features of politics (in general and today), and the spectrum or varieties of 
these norms that operate in our political systems, the possibility that norms, 
and especially constitutional norms, will burst like bubbles seems much less 
likely than does a more gradual, evolutionary process of change.  The bubble-
bursting moment we often observe with norms, though memorable, may just 
be, and likely is in many cases, the final step or the coup de grâce in a much 
more stretched-out process of decay.  
 
between the government and the opposition, see Gregoire Webber, Loyal Opposition and the 
Political Constitution, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358 (2017)) or the norms about political 
fair play previously discussed (see Elster, supra note 47, at 12.  LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 
22, at 105–06, suggest two separate norms of mutual toleration and forbearance which seem to fall 
within what Professor Elster describes as norms of political “fair play”).  Slightly less abstract, but 
in the same category, are other norms such as the ones in the United States about the “deliberative 
presidency” (according to which presidential decisions will be accompanied by some process of 
rational deliberation and vetting; see Renan, supra note 36, at 2221–30), the “public presidency” 
(according to which the United States president will address the nation when issues of high salience 
are unfolding; see Azari & Smith, supra note 50, at 48–49), and the norm that Congress must ensure 
that agencies are adequately staffed and supported.  See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the 
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 38 (2014). 
 100. See Betts & Orchard, supra note 97, at 10–11.  As examples of these kinds of norms, 
consider the alleged norm that exists in Germany whereby the government should guarantee the 
appointment of a representative of the parliamentary opposition to the role of the chair of the 
Bundestag Budget Committee (see Greg Taylor, Conventions by Consensus: Constitutional 
Conventions in Germany, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 303, 314 (2014)) or the norm whereby at least one 
of the two parliamentary representatives who sits on the Israeli Committee on Judicial Selection 
will also be drawn from the parliamentary opposition (see Malvina Halberstam, Judicial Review, a 
Comparative Perspective: Israel, Canada, and the United States, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2393, 2397 
(2010)).  In the United States, it is sometimes suggested that a current norm fixes the number of 
sitting judges on the Supreme Court to nine (see Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of 
Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 505 (2018); Michael C. Dorf, How the Written 
Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 79 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma 
eds., 2009); Pozen, supra note 99, at 69). 
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Of course, this is not to say that a scenario in which norms simply burst 
like soap bubbles is impossible or that it is altogether rare.101  The lack of 
institutionalization of norms, contra law, makes this conceptual possibility a 
real one. But this Part’s goal has been more modest than that. It was only to 
make the case that  in trying to determine how norms change and what rules 
of change might apply to them, as well as identifying the ways actors might 
influence them, much of our focus should be on more gradual and 
evolutionary processes. 
II. “RULES OF CHANGE” FOR CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
If, as Part I argued, constitutional norms do not normally burst like 
bubbles or disappear at a touch, how precisely do we characterize the relevant 
process of evolution?  As discussed in the Introduction, this is in many ways 
the key task that is facing us today in an age of fraying norms.  
This Part suggests that we can make progress in this context if we think 
of norms from an institutional perspective.102  As I argue below, this 
perspective enables us to identify the logic these processes related to 
constitutional norms will likely follow.  Taking Hart’s concepts as a 
metaphor, this Part uncovers constitutional norms’ rules of change. 
Section II.A briefly explains why thinking about norms in institutional 
terms makes sense.  Section II.B then delves into the various mechanisms or 
rules of change for constitutional norms the institutional framework provides 
in more detail.  It explains what each of these mechanisms entails and how 
they work to effect change in constitutional norms. Section II.B moreover 
provides examples of each of these mechanisms’ workings that are taken 
 
 101. For instance, sometimes the “negative feedback” from a norm may appear quite rapidly and 
be significant in scope and extent, thereby triggering the relevant players to reconsider the norm’s 
desirability and giving them an incentive to breach or defect from it permanently.  Sometimes, 
moreover, “critical junctures” in politics are abrupt and condensed rather than stretched, with the 
consequence being the immediate collapse of norms.  In addition, within any given political regime, 
some norms are more important than others.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE 
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 76 (2015) (distinguishing between “foundational” level 
and “marginal” level norms (emphases omitted)).  Accordingly, when the norms of the inferior or 
marginal kind come under some pressure, the overall system may “signal” that it can do without it 
or that it is replaceable in ways that facilitate the conditions for bubble bursting.  When these inferior 
norms are breached, the regime and the institutions that reflect and enforce it in specific polities will 
not necessarily come to these norms’ defense.  
 102. Previous accounts dealing with these questions are Joseph Jaconelli, Continuity and Change 
in Constitutional Conventions, in THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, A 
FESTSCHRIFT FOR VERNON BOGDANOR 121 (Matt Qvortrup ed., 2013); Chafetz & Pozen, supra 
note 2; and Nicholas Barry, Narelle Miragliotta & Zim Nwokora, The Dynamics of Constitutional 
Conventions in Westminster Democracies, 72 PARLIAMENTARY AFFS. 664 (2019).  As the 
discussion in the text and notes makes clear, the account presented here differs along important 
dimensions than those previous accounts.  
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from an array of jurisdictions, including: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Israel, and even from the global context. The examples 
are also drawn from different periods of time: as early as the beginning of the 
American Republic and as late as President Donald Trump’s first 
impeachment trial. 
A. Norms as Informal Institutions 
The broad literature analyzing norms in general and constitutional 
norms in particular often resorts to discussing them as “equilibri[ums].”103  
This image is valuable, as it illustrates some core features of these norms, 
including that they are built on a set of expectations and beliefs that multiple 
participants share.104  At the same time, that image can be misleading if it is 
taken as exhaustive or if it prevents us from seeing what political norms, 
including constitutional norms, might share with other relevant phenomena.   
As is relevant here, the image of equilibrium can prove misleading if it 
distracts us from the fact that norms are very much like normal institutions, 
though of an informal nature rather than a formal one.  
Given that institutions are sometimes depicted (and explained) in 
scholarship as equilibriums themselves,105 this should not be surprising.106  
The analytical benefits that this relatively straightforward move yields may 
be surprising though.  Indeed, as I argue in the next Section, that insight 
enables us to identify the mechanisms through which constitutional norms 
are likely to change—either to transform into something entirely different or 
to completely disappear or die.  And in Part III below, we will also see that 
these mechanisms can further help us identify the various strategies different 
actors can use to try to manipulate constitutional norms for their own 
purposes.  
B. Mechanisms of Gradual Change 
In scholarship that studies institutions, the idea that institutional 
transformations occur only via more radical external shifts in the political or 
social environment might have been strong in the past, but it is no longer 
 
 103. For discussion of the equilibrium analogy, see Siegel, supra note 13, at 180–81. 
 104. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 105. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Intermittent Institutions, 10 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 420, 439 
(2011) (“Institutions are just equilibria, temporarily settled networks of mutually-adjusted 
expectations.”).  This view, to be sure, is controversial in the philosophical literature.  See generally 
CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF 
CORPORATE AGENTS (2011).  
 106. Indeed, some previous literature discusses constitutional norms in the US context explicitly 
as a form of “informal institutions.”  See Azari & Smith, supra note 50. 
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dominant.107  Largely as a result of the work historians did examining 
institutions through time, it is now widely acknowledged that institutions 
often change gradually.  This “gradualist”108 literature has furthermore 
exposed a frequent disconnect between processes and results. Despite the 
reality in which institutional change happens gradually and piecemeal, the 
extent of the change brought forth may in reality be quite significant, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.109  As work in this vein began to accumulate, 
scholars were able to identify distinct mechanisms of change that seemed to 
apply more generally across various institutional contexts.110  
Until now, implementation of these mechanisms of gradual institutional 
change has been more focused on formal institutions.  Nothing, however, 
makes those mechanisms inapplicable to the context of informal institutions 
as well.  Though in relation to these informal institutions, such as 
constitutional norms, the informality makes it difficult to identify the relevant 
institutional rules by which each of the mechanisms operates to effect 
change; this is an empirical difficulty, not a conceptual one.  And while 
empirical challenges are not to be dismissed, they are also not prohibitive.111  
 
 107. See generally Jeroen van der Heijden, A Short History of Studying Incremental Institutional 
Change: Does Explaining Institutional Change Provide Any New Explanations, 4 REGUL. & 
GOVERNANCE 230 (2013) (supplying a survey of the evolution in thinking about institutional 
change within the academy, and how the focus has particularly moved to more evolutionary 
processes).  
 108. Martin B. Carstensen, Institutional Bricolage in Times of Crisis, 9 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 
139 (2017).  
 109. This literature is especially legion in the context of studies in political economy.  See, e.g., 
GREAT EXPECTATIONS, SLOW TRANSFORMATIONS: INCREMENTAL CHANGE IN POST-CRISIS 
REGULATION (Manuela Moschella & Eleni Tsingou eds., 2013) (collection of essays on gradual 
institutional change); COLIN CROUCH, CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND CHANGE: RECOMBINANT 
GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS 16 (2005); Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid 
Quack, Overcoming Path Dependency: Path Generation in Open Systems, 36 THEORY & SOC’Y 
161, 166 (2007); Marc Schneiberg, What’s on the Path? Path Dependence, Organizational 
Diversity and the Problem of Institutional Change in the U.S. Economy, 1900-1950, 5 SOCIO.-
ECON. REV. 47, 48 (2007); Gregory Jackson & Richard Deeg, The Long-Term Trajectories of 
Institutional Change in European Capitalism, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1109, 1110 (2012).   
 110. I rely here mostly on the pioneering work of Professor Kathleen Thelen and her 
collaborators.  See Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED 
POLITICAL ECONOMIES 1–39 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005); James Mahoney 
& Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER 1 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2009). 
 111. I note that Professors Chafetz and Pozen’s account, supra note 2, at 1438, takes more 
seriously the limitation created by the informality of norms given that they do not pursue the analogy 
to rules/standards “bleed[ing]” into each other more fully.  
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1. Layering 
The first mechanism helpfully fleshed out by the scholarship on 
institutional change is layering.  In this dynamic, institutional change does 
not occur via the attempt to abolish institutional rules or understandings 
currently in place.  Rather, it occurs via the grafting of new rules on top of, 
or alongside, existing ones.  These new layered rules may interact with the 
previous ones in various ways.  They may, for instance, introduce exceptions 
to the previous rules or add limitations to their scope.  But the new layers 
may also be new rules with no direct bearing on the preexisting ones.  
The effect that layering has on an institution and that leads to change is 
therefore quite subtle.  First, it may be in the way that the resulting new 
reality—where we find a more “layered” institution—eventually structures 
institutional behavior and whether these new behavioral structures result in 
“compromis[ing] the stable reproduction of the original ‘core’”112 of the 
institution.113  Second, given the new behaviors or expectations that occur 
due to layering, layering brings forth a cognitive effect on the way individuals 
perceive the institution, as this process disrupts or complicates institutional 
coherence and creates uncertainties about institutional expectations and goals 
(through what is sometimes called “differential growth”114 or what we can 
describe as change by complexity).  
The identification of the process of layering in the context of formal 
institutions is ubiquitous.  For instance, layering has been used to describe 
how the United States Congress has changed over time115 or how the political 
economy of social democracies has evolved to a narrower version of 
capitalism.116  In both examples, what was found to foster the change was the 
accumulation of new institutional rules rather than the complete replacement 
 
 112. Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 17. 
 113. “System analysis” has illustrated the ways that small institutional changes within a system 
can influence its entire operation.  See generally Vermeule, supra note 64. 
 114. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 110, at 23.  
 115. See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).  
 116. For a general survey, see Jeroen van der Heijden, Institutional Layering: A Review of the 
Use of the Concept, 31 POLITICS 9 (2011).  See also Kathleen Thelen, Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies, 47 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 471, 484 (2009) (discussing the German 
economy as a case of “institutional layering”); KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN 
(2004) (identifying layering as instrumental in the process of change that has gone through the 
institutional framework in charge of supplying skills for workers in various countries); Bruno Palier, 
Tracking the Evolution of a Single Instrument Can Reveal Profound Changes: The Case of Funded 
Pensions in France, 20 GOVERNANCE 85 (2007) (identifying layering in the process of pension 
regulation in France). 
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of old ones, which cumulatively made the relevant institution function 
differently from how it was originally imagined.117  
As mentioned earlier, there is no conceptual barrier to applying the logic 
of layering in the context of informal institutions generally and to 
constitutional norms specifically.118  And, indeed, layering seems to perfectly 
capture some, perhaps even many, processes of change in relation to 
constitutional norms.  To illustrate this, I begin with an example from 
overseas and then return to one that more directly draws on constitutional 
affairs in the United States.   
(1.1) The Royal Prerogative over Military Affairs in the United 
Kingdom: One useful site to demonstrate the workings and utility of layering 
as a mechanism of change in the context of constitutional norms lies in the 
U.K. government’s prerogative power to authorize use of military force.  In 
the not-so-remote-past, that power—which is a well-known constitutional 
norm or convention in the United Kingdom rather than hard or formal law—
was understood as allowing the government to decide matters relating to the 
use of the military without needing to secure any form of parliamentary 
approval.119  This understanding, however, no longer seems valid in the 
 
 117. Professors Chafetz and Pozen’s work, supra note 2, suggests that the process of change in 
constitutional norms resembles the process by which rules and standards become “standard[ized]” 
or “rul[ified]” (respectively).  See id. at 1437–38; see also Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice 
and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2005).  Rulification or 
standardization of formal legal norms may however just be examples of the more general 
mechanism of institutional layering in the context of formal legal rules. 
 118. Though this Article is the first to apply the concept of layering to the informal institutions 
that are constitutional norms, I note that similar ideas could be found in other contexts.  For instance, 
psychologists have described the idea of “concept creep” according to which particular 
psychological concepts gradually expand to include new incidents.  See Nick Haslam, Concept 
Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology, 27 PSYCH. INQUIRY 1, 1 (2016).  
This process is precisely what institutionalists would describe as layering, given that it includes 
adding new layers to a previously established institution—in this case, the informal institution of 
diagnostic criteria in professional psychology.  In the sociology of sciences, layering has affinities 
with Thomas Kuhn’s conceptualization of the way scientific revolutions in relation to specific 
scientific paradigms occur.  See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(Otto Neurath et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970).  As Kuhn theorized, scientific paradigms change after a long 
period of experimentation that gradually qualifies the paradigm, a period he called “normal 
science.”  When a significant number of qualifications has been accumulated—a “crisis” is 
generated in relation to the relevant scientific paradigm, which in turn brings forth the birth of a 
new scientific paradigm.  Layering, it seems, captures this process of normal science-ing.  Note that 
both the examples just mentioned are familiar to legal scholars.  For a treatment of the idea of 
psychological “concept creep” to law, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Power of the Normal 1 (Nov. 26, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the SSRN) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3239204.  Kuhn’s theory has gained many applications in legal thinking.  For a 
relatively recent one, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life 
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016).  
 119. See Claire Mills, Parliamentary Approval for Military Action, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7166, at 4 (May 8, 2018).  Of course, in the United States the 
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United Kingdom.  Rather, the norm has been qualified, perhaps substantially 
so.  As it stands now, it seems that at least some level of parliamentary 
involvement is required for at least some domain of warfare decisions.120  
The exact details of the qualifications—or the precise contours of the 
current constitutional norm in the United Kingdom—are less important for 
present purposes.  They are presently unclear and hotly disputed.121  What is 
clear though that a change has indeed occurred.  And what is of interest here 
lies in the process whereby that change in the meaning of that constitutional 
norm was ultimately achieved.   
More specifically, the changed scope of the power of the British 
government over military affairs was achieved gradually, through a series of 
cumulative steps.122  First, in 2002, the norm was first somewhat qualified in 
practice by parliament’s ability to extract a debate on the legislative floor 
about a matter understood to be covered by the norm: British military 
involvement in Iraq.123  Second, it was later further qualified in 2003 given 
parliament’s ability to guarantee that votes would in fact be taken after 
debate.  At the time, the U.K. government had agreed to the arrangement 
given that it controlled a disciplined parliamentary majority and knew that it 
was not likely to lose any specific vote, including on matters the relevant 
constitutional norm seemed to clearly cover.124  But that new qualification 
also proved resilient through time and despite the replacement of 
governments125 until, eventually, in 2013, it led to a government’s defeat on 
a vote regarding British military intervention in Syria.126 In the final 
development, that defeat was followed by an announcement by the then 
prime minister, David Cameron, that the government would respect the 
vote’s outcome.127  
 
question of whether the President has unilateral power in military affairs is deeply contested.  The 
text of the Constitution seems to require some not insignificant intervention of Congress.  See, e.g., 
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — Framing 
the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). 
 120. See VERONKIA FIKFAK & HAYLEY HOOPER, PARLIAMENT’S SECRET WAR 2 (2018). 
 121. See Mills, supra note 119, at 5–6; see also James Strong, The War Powers of the British 
Parliament: What Has Been Established and What Remains Unclear?, 20 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L 
REL. 19 (2018). 
 122. The description in the text is based mostly on the account provided by Philippe Lagassé, 
Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations in 
Institutional Change and Legislative Control, 70 PARLIAMENTARY AFFS. 280 (2017). 
 123. Id. at 285. 
 124. Id.  
 125. For the discussion of the various events that kept breathing life to the new qualification, see 
id. at 285–89. 
 126. See Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBCNEWS (Aug. 30, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783.  
 127. Lagassé, supra note 122, at 289. 
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Whatever the merits and demerits of legislative involvement in military 
affairs, the process described here in an extremely stylized way typifies the 
layering dynamic.  Each qualification or extraction achieved by parliament 
throughout the process did not replace the norm of prerogative power or 
abolish it.  More accurately, it was rather akin to a new rule or practice that 
was added on top of that original constitutional norm.  Importantly, 
moreover, each distinct layer added might have been crucial for the process 
of change.  Without parliament’s ability to extract the rule that votes would 
be allowed even if the government controls parliament with a disciplined 
majority, a vote when parliament did not have a similarly disciplined majority 
might not have transpired.  And without the prime minister’s announcement 
that the government would respect the vote, making clear that there is a rule 
that parliament’s input could play a role in decisions about military affairs, 
we might not have arrived at where the norm seems to be today.  
(1.2) The Norm Against More Than Two Presidential Terms: In our own 
system in the United States, the previously mentioned128 constitutional norm 
that allegedly existed about presidents not serving more than two terms 
supplies another example of layering—at least on some interpretations of the 
historical record.  As is well-known, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was of 
course the first, and thus far the only, president to serve more than two terms 
in office prior to the Twenty-Second Amendment’s passage.  But FDR’s bid 
at least partly relied on earlier events that served to complicate the meaning 
of the previous constitutional norm that prohibited more than two terms.  
Indeed, none of these events were directly applicable or covered FDR’s own 
case—either because they were unusual129 or because they ultimately proved 
unsuccessful.130  Nonetheless, it may well be that without those previous 
occurrences, FDR might not have made his bid for a third term or at least that 
those circumstances helped him greatly in doing so.131  Again, as in the 
context of the norm on absolute government authority over military affairs in 
the United Kingdom, each event that composes the story about the norm of 
the no presidential third term can be viewed as a layer that, in accumulation, 
led to the overall change or made it possible. 
 
 128. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 129. Theodore Roosevelt’s bid was for a nonconsecutive third term and after he had been elected 
to office only once.  See Azari & Smith, supra note 50, at 44. 
 130. Theodore Roosevelt had been defeated, and Ulysses Grant, whose circumstances more 
closely resembled FDR’s, lost his bid at the nomination stage.  For a useful survey and discussion, 
see KORZI, supra note 51, at 43–79. 
 131. In Professor Korzi’s account, the decisive cause for FDR’s success is attributed to the 
prospect of United States involvement in WWII.  See id. at 80. 
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Many more potential examples of layering exist.132  Indeed, layering is 
very likely an extremely common process whereby constitutional norms 
change in an evolutionary way.  
2. Drift 
Layering is only one type of gradual institutional change mechanism, 
however.  A second mechanism of change earlier literature on institutional 
change has usefully identified is drift.   
In contrast to layering, institutional drift is not accompanied by an 
attempt to add new layers of rules to the preexisting institution.  Layering, in 
that sense, is an active process of change.  What is unique about institutional 
change through drift is that the institutional rules remain in place even though 
the institutional environment is changing at the same time.  Drift then can be 
described as passive change or change through institutional inaction.  When 
drift occurs, the institution may look as though it remains the same.  But 
ultimately it is discovered to accomplish far different goals from the ones it 
was meant to initially achieve.  The change is affected through the way an 
unchanged (or even neglected) institution interacts with a different 
environment.133 
Drift has been extensively applied to the study of formal institutions, 
including legal ones.  Drift, for instance, was used to explain the evolution in 
the institution of the United States’ minimum wage.134  Professor David 
Pozen’s work on the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) has also 
identified the process of drift that occurred in that context, which transformed 
the regulatory framework of transparency in our system from one that was 
meant to achieve more distributive and social justice types of goals to a 
framework that actually supports corporate and commercial interests.135  In 
both cases, the change occurred because the relevant institutions simply did 
not adapt in response to new realities—either to the changed levels of 
inflation, as in the case of the minimum wage, or the use of the regime by 
 
 132. In the United States, the evolution of the norms that regulate the legal advice function in 
the executive branch and specifically to the incumbent president might be a relevant example.  See 
Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805 (2017).  For a comparative 
example, the developments in the norms that govern the so-called pacifist Constitution of Japan are 
illustrative as well.  See Rosalind Dixon & Guy Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional Moments? A 
Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 67 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 145 (2019).  
 133. Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 17.  For another seminal account of drift as a 
mechanism of change, from which Professors Mahoney and Thelen’s analysis significantly draws, 
see Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of 
Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243 (2004).  
 134. Professor Jacob Hacker’s work in the context of welfare policy is considered canonical.  
See Hacker, supra note 133. 
 135. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018). 
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different types of institutions and players than were originally expected, as in 
the case of FOIA.136  
The mechanism of drift seems applicable as well to informal institutions 
such as constitutional norms, as the following examples seek to illustrate.137  
Again, I start with some examples from overseas before I return to our own 
system in the United States. 
(2.1) Norms Governing Appointments in Australia and Israel: In the 
state of Queensland in Australia, a constitutional norm exists whereby 
whenever a seat in the upper legislative house opens up in between 
elections—in what is known as “casual vacancy“138—the vacancy ought to 
be filled by a representative of the same party with which the previous 
incumbent was affiliated.  In 1975, a seat opened after the death of an 
incumbent senator and Queensland’s prime minister appointed a replacement 
from within the ranks of the party that held the vacant seat. Nonetheless, the 
person appointed was known to have consistently voted against his party and 
with the government.139   
Similarly, Israeli constitutional politics includes what is at least 
arguably a constitutional norm whereby one of the two legislative 
representatives in the Committee on Judicial Selection must be a member of 
the parliamentary opposition.140  During some time in the lifetime of recent 
former governments in Israel, however, the member who occupied the 
relevant seat in the committee was, though nominally a member of the 
opposition, in fact a member of a party that usually votes within the political 
bloc that supports the government.141 
 
 136. For an additional example drawn from Germany, see Thelen, supra note 116.  
 137. In fact, similarly to what we have seen in the context of the mechanism of layering, such 
application is not entirely novel.  David Pozen’s account of FOIA, supra note 135, discusses formal 
institutions (in law), but it relies heavily on Jack Balkin’s conceptualization of “ideological drift,” 
which seeks to capture how legal concepts, ideas, or tropes of arguments, all informal institutions, 
may experience drift.  See Jack M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 
CONN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1993); Jack M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent 
Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (1994). 
 138. For this term, see Joan Rydon, Casual Vacancies in the Australian Senate, 11 POLITICS 195 
(1976). 
 139. See Paul D. Williams, Leaders and Political Culture: The Development of the Queensland 
Premiership, 1859-2009, 16 QUEENSL. REV. 15, 24–25 (2009).  
 140. See Malvina Halberstam, Judicial Review, A Comparative Perspective: Israel, Canada, and 
the United States, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2393, 2396 (2010).  
 141. See Lahav Harkov, Yisrael Beytenu MK Ilatov Can Stay on Judicial Selection Committee, 
JERUSALEM POST (May 22, 2016), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-
Diplomacy/Yisrael-Beytenu-MK-Ilatov-can-stay-on-Judicial-Selection-Committee-454667.  
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In Queensland, Australia similar circumstances to the one previously 
described did not recur.142  And in Israel, it is unclear as of yet whether what 
has previously happened will be repeated.143  We also do not know with any 
degree of certainty whether the fact that these Queenslandian and Israeli 
constitutional norms make party affiliation so central was because, at the time 
they crystalized, and in the conditions of each state or country, such 
affiliation served as an accurate proxy for political behavior and whether this 
particular reality had changed in any systematic way.  Suppose though that it 
had and that that incident would repeat itself in Israel and has theoretically 
repeated itself in Australia.  Under those conditions, the relevant 
constitutional norms in both instances would be perfect examples of how 
change through drift occurs—the norms remained the same while the 
surrounding conditions changed.144  
(2.2) Separation of Powers Norms in the United States: The examples 
from above were somewhat exceptional.  The context of political parties 
seems, however, ripe for similar examples of drift given how the function of 
parties has changed so substantially during the twentieth century and given 
how many of our political and constitutional norms interact with political 
party operations.145  In this spirit, and for something more enduring and that 
characterizes our own system, consider the following. 
Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, a movement of 
“responsible party government” was underway in the United States.146  The 
movement criticized the American constitutional order based on more or less 
the following: In this movement’s view, the political landscape in the United 
States has changed dramatically since the time of the United States 
Constitution’s drafting in 1789.  Despite the framers’ lack of foresight, 
political parties were almost immediately established after the Constitution’s 
ratification.  Moreover, as time passed, and certainly in the twentieth century 
 
 142. In fact, following the controversy that arose in 1975, the Constitution of Queensland was 
amended to prevent such events from recurring.  See Gerard Newman, Senate Casual Vacancies, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (May 14, 2002), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100914110822/http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2001-
02/02rn35.htm.  
 143. At the time of writing, Israel is going through another round of coalition government 
negotiations post-election.  See Gil Hoffman, Compromises Paving Way to Unity, JERUSALEM POST 
(June 2, 2021), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/new-government-still-not-ready-669875.  
 144. The change is in relation to the effectivity of party/coalition-opposition affiliation as the 
relevant proxy for political behavior. 
 145. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006). 
 146. See generally Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 813, 827–31 (2000); AUSTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY 
GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE (1954). 
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when parties had become more polarized and disciplined, political parties 
transformed into one of the defining institutions in American constitutional 
politics.  
In the eyes of those affiliated with what we associate today with the 
responsible party government movement, this was a positive development 
given the high value they saw in the institutions of political parties and the 
opportunities they provide for organizing a more diffuse republic.  
Nonetheless, the proponents of responsible party government believed that 
something was hindering their program.  That something, they thought, lay 
in the fixation they believed many in the United States attach to the separation 
of powers framework and specifically the separation between Congress and 
the presidency.  To advocates of responsible party government, this 
separation should not be as salient and significant as many others thought it 
should be, at least during periods of unified government, common during this 
time.  Rather, policy decisions should be exclusively or at least primarily 
filtered through the party.  When parties are strong, they suggested, inter-
branch conflict during times of unified government should not normally 
occur.147  If this were to happen regularly, it would be akin to an illegitimate 
hold out by factions seeking to increase their standing outside normal party 
structures.148 
In the United States, as many today recognize, the rules of separation of 
powers are only partially enforced by hard law and are regulated by a set of 
constitutional norms.149  In that sense, we can understand the claims advanced 
by advocates of responsible party government in terms of the drift that has 
occurred in the norms that underlie understandings of how structural 
constitutional arrangements in the United States operate.  Even though a 
significant change in the environment has transpired—given the reality and 
centrality of parties to the working of constitutional government in the United 
States—the old separation-of-powers norms were still applied rather rigidly 
as if the change had not occurred.  The norms failed to adapt and hence to 
achieve what they were originally designed to do—among other things, to 
 
 147. As James Wilson puts it, the party system should be able to “overcome the separation of 
powers by bringing together under informal arrangements what the founders were at pains to divide 
by formal ones.”  See James Q. Wilson, Political Parties and the Separation of Powers, in 
SEPARATION OF POWERS — DOES IT STILL WORK? 18, 18 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman 
eds., 1986).  
 148. For recent discussion that emphasizes these kinds of concerns—though in my view that also 
inflates their importance—see Gregory Elinson, Party Divisions and the Separation of Powers, 
BALKINIZATION (Sept. 22, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/09/party-divisions-and-
separation-of-powers.html.  
 149. For one illustration of this view, see Pozen, supra note 99. 
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channel the public view and to make sure that the government accomplishes 
what it has set out to do.150  
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the reality of divided 
government returned to the United States and became commonplace, even 
persistent.  Accordingly, most of the momentum behind the responsible party 
government movement has waned.151  Today, however, very similar impulses 
to the ones that characterized the responsible party government movement 
are appearing in a different incarnation.  Indeed, it may very well be that what 
replaced the claims of responsible party government in this day of divided 
government in the United States is the thesis of “presidential 
administration.”152   
Like the responsible party government’s claim, the presidential 
administration thesis is critical of assertions that norms of separation of 
powers require—in all cases—the involvement of all branches of government 
in a so-called articulated or classic process.153  For supporters of this thesis, 
moreover, insistence on this understanding of separation of powers norms 
causes drift in the relevant separation of powers norms.  Unlike supporters of 
responsible party government, however, advocates of presidential 
administration no longer rely primarily and directly on political parties as the 
institutional remedy for the changed circumstances in the larger political 
environment.  Given the reality of recurring instances of divided government, 
these keen-spirited advocates turned their eyes elsewhere and found the 
institution of the presidency to be the most fitting (suggesting, in essence, 
that only acknowledgment of the legitimacy of and place for muscular 
presidential policy leadership would best serve the goals that structural 
constitutional norms in the United States were meant to achieve in the first 
place).154  
As the discussion of these examples suggests, it can be rather difficult 
to find clear instances of constitutional norms that have changed through 
processes of drift.155  Nonetheless, the mechanism of drift should not be ruled 
 
 150. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 795 (2001).  
 151. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 329–32 (2011). 
 152. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001).  
 153. For this claim, see Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 433 (2013).  
 154. For a highly enthusiastic endorsement of this view, see generally WILLIAM G. HOWELL & 
TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT—AND 
WHY WE NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY (2016); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
 155. Because norms are not formalized, this may not be that surprising, as they usually would 
be able to change in accordance with new realities and circumstances—precisely what would make 
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out of hand in the context of the informal institutions that are constitutional 
norms.  In some instances, we may find a particular political system that has 
so deeply internalized specific norms that relevant players in this system find 
it impossible to adapt them to respond to changes in the larger political 
environment, for example, given the rise in significance of political parties.  
Though likely controversial, the last two examples suggest that norms 
regarding the separation of powers in the United States are one context in 
which drift has indeed been occurring.  Discussions of constitutional 
reverence in the United States suggest other contexts exist as well.156   
3. Conversion 
A third mechanism of institutional change, conversion, captures yet 
another process of gradual transformation.  Conversion describes a process 
whereby the preexisting institutional rules are reinterpreted and redeployed 
in the service of new institutional goals.157   
To gain a better sense of the mechanics of conversion and its 
distinctiveness, it can be contrasted with the previously discussed 
mechanisms of both layering and drift.  Like layering but unlike drift, 
conversion requires active engagement with institutional rules.  Like drift but 
different from layering, conversion leads to a straightforward change in the 
purposes that institutions serve and not only change that can be identified at 
the system level or through complexity and ambiguation.  And again, unlike 
layering, the engagement is achieved through reinterpretation of preexisting 
rules rather than via the addition of new layers on top or alongside these rules.  
At times, institutional conversion can be full or complete—in the sense 
that the institution is simply repurposed into completing an entirely new task.  
Sometimes, however, the institutional conversion can be more nuanced, as 
when a new goal is added to an institution through the reinterpretation of 
preexisting institutional rules or when its previously established priorities are 
 
drift impossible (or, perhaps more accurately, they will be able to do so more easily because they 
lack the barriers that formalized norms face).  As identifying drift requires examining the interaction 
between the original substance or content of the norms and the present environment in which they 
operate, any claim that norms are experiencing drift will likely also be disputed, not only because 
different people will pursue different understandings of what the original form of the norm was but 
also because of norms’ informal and uncodified nature.  Another complication in identifying drift 
is that those who flag it will also likely be suggesting institutional reforms. In turn, these reforms 
may hide the way the critique is restorative rather than related to changing the institution into 
something that is new.  The rhetoric of “reform,” in other words, may be misleading.  See also infra 
notes 240–246 and accompanying text (discussing “politics of unfreezing” in response to change 
through drift).  
 156. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) IX (2006). 
 157. See Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 17–18.   
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rearranged via similar reinterpretation.  For example, when an institution 
maintains two principal goals, one primary and another secondary, the 
process whereby an institution begins to enforce the secondary goal more 
consistently than the primary one through a reinterpretation of the relevant 
institutional rules that speak to those priorities is also considered a case of 
conversion.  
A useful illustration of conversion in institutional reality is “mission 
creep” that sometimes is traced in military units that begin with one specific 
mandate but then, over time, that mandate changes course.  For instance, 
many explain what happened during the Korean War as a case of 
conversion—given how the goals of the unit sent to fight in Korea changed 
from driving North Korea out of South Korea to removing the regime and 
reuniting the Korean Peninsula.158  In addition, the Sherman Act159 may also 
exemplify a case of conversion.  The act was initially implemented with the 
explicit goal of breaking up business trusts that were “in restraint of trade.”160  
Nonetheless, corporations were able to convince federal courts in the more 
medium run to apply the Sherman Act to labor unions, too, a development 
that significantly changed the act’s original goal through reinterpretation and 
hence conversion.161  
Conversion also occurs in relation to informal institutions, including 
constitutional norms.  To illustrate this, we may in fact begin with the 
example with which we ended the discussion of the mechanism of drift—
about the American presidency.  
3.1 Norms Regarding Presidential Policy Leadership in the United 
States: The “presidential administration” thesis previously mentioned162 is 
not only a normative project that seeks to expose, in the terms I have used, 
how separation-of-powers’ norms in the United States have drifted.  It is also 
a descriptive project that highlights the fact that American presidents play a 
much more significant role in leading policymaking on the domestic front 
than they did previously.   
Indeed, until around the end of the nineteenth and even the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the American president played a rather marginal role 
 
 158. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Korb & Max Hoffman, Mission Creep: A Short History, POLITICO, 
(Sept. 5, 2013, 5:06 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/barack-obama-war-syria-
096308. 
 159. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1–7 (1890).  
 160. Id. at § 1. 
 161. See Jacob S. Hecker, Paul Pierson, & Kathleen Thelen, Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces 
of Institutional Change, in ADVANCES IN COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 181 (James 
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2015). 
 162. See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
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in domestic policy, and Congress used to take the lead.163  Presidents rarely 
proposed legislation, for instance, but would rather satisfy themselves with 
making suggestions when asked about it.164  Presidents moreover maintained 
only a small staff to aid them with pursuing and developing more robust 
domestic policy visions.165 
Over time, this began to change, and the president has taken on a much 
more significant domestic policy role.  Presidents now regularly propose bills 
to Congress and have become what some describe as “Legislator[s]-in-
Chief.”166  Presidents furthermore regularly use their powers to steer the 
various administrative agencies that formulate and implement policy in the 
United States in ways that would make them most responsive to the 
president’s own policy wishes.167  Although some of this was achieved by 
formal means or institutions, such as legislation,168 the core features of this 
new role the presidency now possesses in the United States—especially given 
the marginalization of Congress in this process—are often described as 
something that occurred informally at the constitutional level, through 
changed understandings of the constitutional norms that surround the 
presidency and separation of powers more broadly.169  
Given that this portrays the redeployment of the institution of the 
presidency toward new goals through reinterpretation of norms that apply to 
it, we can accordingly identify this process as one of conversion.  It is 
different from layering because nothing new was added at the constitutional 
level itself, which remained the same throughout the process of transition of 
the role of the presidency.  Much of the relevant “work” that caused change 
in the nature of the presidency was carried out via the reinterpretation or 
redeployment of previously existing norms that applied to this institution in 
the larger constitutional scheme, given the rise of a robust policy state in the 
twentieth century.170   
 
 163. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 132, at 2234–35. 
 164. See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
346–81 (1994); Tushnet, supra note 77, at 533. 
 165. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Foreword—From Takeover to Merger: Reforming 
Administrative Law in the Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1105–06 
(2008). 
 166. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
 167. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 152, at 2248–50. 
 168. See, e.g., Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–912).  
 169. For a recent and crisp articulation of this position, see Renan, supra note 132, at 2245–46.  
 170. For an outstanding overview and exposition of this claim, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, THE POLICY STATE: AN AMERICAN PREDICAMENT 123–38 (2017).  It may be 
interesting to note that a similar process of conversion may in fact be one element characterizing 
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3.2 Norms Regulating Impeachment in the United States: The previous 
example about the role of the presidency demonstrates conversion in which 
priorities or goals are added to an informal institution or norm via 
reinterpretation.  But as discussed earlier, conversion can also cause a 
rearrangement in priorities if it makes what appeared to be an institution’s 
secondary goal transform into the principal one.  This can also occur to 
constitutional norms.  
An example of this dynamic can be found in the constitutional norms 
that regulate presidential impeachment in the United States.  Again, as in the 
context of separation of powers discussed in relation to drift, the 
impeachment process in the United States is also importantly regulated by 
informal constitutional norms rather than by hard law.171  In recent times, 
these constitutional norms were at the center of public attention, given the 
first and then second impeachment trials of former President Trump (as is 
well-known, both were ultimately unsuccessful).  
In the context of the first impeachment trial, one of President Trump’s 
main lines of defense was that he should not be impeached and removed 
because his conduct did not amount to a criminal offense.  Many believe that 
this claim—presented most forcefully by President Trump’s attorney and 
former Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz—is false as a matter 
of history or appropriate constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, as more than 
ample evidence suggests, the goals of the impeachment process were rather 
 
the position of chief executives more broadly.  After all, the appearance of robust policy states is 
not a unique American phenomenon but occurred in many other political systems as well.  
Accordingly, much like this development helped empower the presidency in the United States, as 
just discussed, so too did it have a similar effect of empowering the position of the chief executive 
in those other systems.  Some have moreover described this trend as the “presidentialization of 
politics.”  See generally THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds., 2005).  The United Kingdom serves 
as an example of this trend, one that in many ways also resembles that found in the United States.  
Although in the past, and particularly before WWII, the prime minister played a rather minimal role 
in domestic policy making, and the task was understood to fall to the constitutional executive in the 
form of the cabinet as a whole, things are rather different today.  Though the norm of “cabinet 
government” is still understood to apply in the United Kingdom, its meaning has undoubtedly 
changed.  Today the prime minister is often the “hub” through which many of the policies are 
filtered and often dictated, rather than the cabinet (this was particularly evident during most of the 
premiership of Tony Blair.  See Martin Burch & Ian Holliday, The Blair Government and the Core 
Executive, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 1 (2004)).  The British premiership, in other words, has been 
redeployed to achieve new goals—from exclusively a role of chairperson of cabinet to a more active 
domestic policy leader and even independent policy decider.  And this has all occurred through what 
is essentially a reinterpretation of the relevant governing constitutional norms, very much like the 
parallel process that transpired in the American presidency.  See generally ANDREW BLICK & 
GEORGE JONES, PREMIERSHIP: THE DEVELOPMENT, NATURE, AND POWER OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER (2010). 
 171. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, A Formidable Weapon of Faction? The Law and Politics of 
Impeachment, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 394–96 (2020). 
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broad, and the meaning of the term “high crimes and misdemeanors” used to 
be—in a norm-based sense—that impeachment could be exercised for a 
potentially expansive class of political offenses, including offenses that can 
be indicted by criminal law.172  And this view also has strong normative 
appeal. Given this, Trump’s claims appeared, certainly for many, to be no 
more than “constitutional nonsense.”173  
There is, however, a different view available that portrays Trump’s 
claims as less nonsensical.  While it is true that the relevant constitutional 
norms around the process of impeachment were broad in the past, some 
suggest that these norms have changed.174  More specifically, given the 
reality and growth of political parties, and especially at times of increased 
political partisanship in the United States, the contemporary understanding 
of impeachment has become much more limited than in the past and may 
indeed include—as President Trump has argued—only behaviors that are 
criminally indictable.175  As one commentator puts it, the “party-political 
logic overwhelmed the Framers’ design.”176  
There is undeniable force to this claim, at least as a descriptive matter.177  
In times of political polarization, the broad understanding of which forms of 
conduct constitute an impeachable offense simply does not make sense; or 
perhaps more accurately, simply no longer coincides with the reality in which 
the willingness of political parties to use the tool of impeachment against 
presidents from their own parties ought to cross a very significant threshold 
of severity.  And criminal offenses fit the bill much more conspicuously than 
any fuzzy notion of abuse of office or maladministration.178  
To be clear, my intention here is not to arbitrate these claims on the 
normative front.  For my purposes, what matters is that in this view—and 
only at the level of description—we can say a conversion in the informal 
 
 172. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 56, 154 (2017); 
LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT 44–
47 (2018). 
 173. Charlie Savage, ‘Constitutional Nonsense’: Trump’s Impeachment Defense Defies Legal 
Consensus, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/us/politics/trump-
impeachment-legal-defense.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.  
 174. See Stephen M. Griffin, Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The Historical Logic 
of Informal Constitutional Change, 51 CONN. L. REV. 413 (2019).  
 175. Id. at 425.  
 176. Id. at 419.  
 177. See also Julia Azari, The Trump Presidency Thrives on Norms, MISCHIEFS FACTION (May 
8, 2020), https://www.mischiefsoffaction.com/post/the-trump-presidency-thrives-on-norms.  
 178. I note that Professor Griffin also makes a claim that relies on a different reading of the 
historical record and which highlights that there is some truth to the claim that all former presidential 
impeachments were indeed based on a criminal wrong.  For a summary of this particular view, see 
Stephen M. Griffin, On the Persistence of Really Bad Constitutional Arguments, BALKINIZATION 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/01/on-persistence-of-really-bad.html.  
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constitutional norms that control the process of impeachment and removal in 
the United States has occurred: from an informal constitutional norm that 
covers a broad range of priorities or goals—impeaching presidents for a 
variety of inappropriate behaviors and for general maladministration—to 
something that focuses solely on a subset of the priorities that this informal 
norm used to comprise—impeaching only for criminal offenses.  
4. Displacement 
A fourth mechanism of institutional change is displacement.  In this 
dynamic, “new models emerge and diffuse which call into question existing, 
previously taken-for-granted organizational forms and practices.”179   
To better grasp the dynamic of displacement, it can be usefully 
compared with the mechanism of layering discussed previously.  The two are 
alike in the way in which the process that ultimately leads to institutional 
change does not entail abolishing existing institutional rules, or even 
reinterpreting them as in the case of conversion.  They are different because 
layering describes additions to the institutional rules whereas displacement is 
essentially an adding of a new institution, or the resurrection of a dormant 
one, that operates alongside the existing institution in a dynamic of 
competition.  With displacement, the change is achieved by, first, making the 
broad environment denser with competing institutions and, second, by 
creating a dynamic that encourages participants in one institution to defect to 
the new institution.  
A previously studied example of this mechanism in the context of 
formal institutions includes the effect of the introduction of new financial 
regulatory schemes in the EU regarding preexisting trading practices.180  In 
relation to informal norms, consider the following illustrations. 
 
 179. See Streeck & Thelen, supra note 110, at 19. 
 180. See Daniel Gozman & Wendy Currie, The Role of Investment Management Systems in 
Regulatory Compliance: A Post Financial Crisis Study of Displacement Mechanisms, 29 J. INFO. 
TECH. 44 (2014).  For close analogues in the literature to the mechanism of displacement, see 
MARIANA MOTA PARDO & MICHAEL J. TREBLICOCK, INSTITUTIONAL BYPASSES: A STRATEGY TO 
PROMOTE REFORMS FOR DEVELOPMENT 18-23 (2018) (discussing and identifying “institutional 
bypasses”); Ronald J. Gilson, et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate 
Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 478 (2011) 
(discussing and identifying “regulatory dualism”); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping 
Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212 (discussing the competitive effects 
of overlapping jurisdiction); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (developing further the insights of competitive jurisdictional 
powers).  I note as well that the mechanism of displacement has some connections to ideas 
associated with mimicry and isomorphism in sociological studies of institutions.  See, e.g., Paul J. 
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 147 (1983).  
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4.1 Foreign State Immunity Norm in Customary International Law: One 
useful example of what is captured by displacement can be found in 
customary international law (I discuss other connections to this field in Part 
IV).  Today, most countries adhere to a customary international norm of 
restrictive foreign state immunity, meaning that their citizens can sue foreign 
states only in specific cases.  This was not true, though, in the not-too-remote 
past.  Rather, the norm in customary international law used to be absolute 
state immunity, which wholly restricted the right to sue.   
How has this change occurred?  According to one account,181 it simply 
happened when some states began introducing the norm in a more qualified 
form of restrictive immunity.  With time, many more states found this norm 
attractive (among other things, because they wanted to respond to the fact 
that they might now be exposed to legal liability in countries that enjoy 
absolute immunity in these states’ own jurisdictions).  As an increasing 
number of states began defecting from the norm of absolute immunity, a new 
reality became established.  Indeed, in those states that still abide by a norm 
of absolute immunity, the function immunity fulfills is quite different from 
what it had originally been.182  
4.2 Norms on Delivering the State of the Union in the United States: 
Displacement clearly captures the process of change in the norm of foreign 
state immunity.  For another example of this dynamic, related more closely 
to constitutional norms, consider the change that occurred concerning the 
norm in the United States about the form of the State of the Union address.   
As is well known, President George Washington instituted a practice of 
delivering the State of the Union to Congress in person.  However, President 
Thomas Jefferson changed course early in the life of the country to deliver 
the State of the Union in writing rather than orally.  This practice persisted 
for a long time and was thought of as what we would describe today as a 
clearly established constitutional norm.  But when Woodrow Wilson became 
president in the twentieth century, he chose to revert to the practice of 
 
 181. The discussion in the text draws on Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does 
Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209 (2015). 
 182. For the claim that the process of what I describe here as displacement is in fact a very 
common, perhaps even the pervasive model of change of customary international law, see Jonathan 
I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to Violate 
Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 914–15 (1986) (“In order to effect that 
change, states interested in a new rule of customary law must take action that violates existing law 
and they must encourage others to do the same. . . . If the proponents of the new rule are successful, 
a new consensus of state practice and opinio juris will develop and those nations which had the 
audacity to violate customary law will be found to be behaving consistently with the law.”). 
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delivering the State of the Union orally.183  And that change has remained 
until today.   
One way to explain this change is through the lens of displacement.  
What President Wilson essentially did was revive an old institution—the oral 
deliverance of the State of the Union.  That awakening of the dormant 
practice had a strong enough “pull” that it essentially encouraged every 
successive president to follow the then-dormant practice up until today.  The 
old norm was simply displaced. 
4.3 Norms on Party Selection Methods.  A final example of 
displacement in the context of informal constitutional norms can be found in 
the way political parties conduct themselves.  Today, many countries around 
the world use public primaries to choose party leaders.184 Indeed, this has 
become so entrenched that the primary system has come to be described as 
something like a global norm regarding the organization of political 
parties.185  Peering into the history of how this development has occurred 
reveals that displacement might have been at work.  Though in the past many 
parties had more closed and elitist processes, once one party began crossing 
the line and adopted a more public type of process, other parties quickly 
followed suit—both within the same jurisdiction and across jurisdictions.186   
5. Exhaustion 
All the mechanisms I discussed above are about institutional change 
generally.  They, in other words, capture dynamics that lead to an array of 
changes to institutions and not necessarily a change that will ultimately bring 
about the institution’s demise.  Indeed, institutions that become more 
complex or ambiguous through a process of layering or begin to serve 
different functions (or have their priorities rearranged) due to drift or 
conversion and even exposed to competition and the risk of defection by 
 
 183. This fact is well documented in the literature.  See, e.g., STATE OF THE UNION: 
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC FROM WOODROW WILSON TO GEORGE W. BUSH xi (Deborah Kalb et al. 
eds., 2007).  See also HORWILL, supra note 48, at 199–201.  
 184. For a survey, see Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, Populism and Institutional 
Design: Methods of Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U L. REV. 647 (2018).  See 
also William Cross & Andre Blais, Who Selects the Party Leader?, 18 PARTY POL. 127 (2012). 
 185. See William P. Cross & Jean-Benoit Pilet, The Selection of Party Leaders in Contemporary 
Parliamentary Democracies, in THE SELECTION OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS IN 
CONTEMPORARY PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 10 (Jean-Benoit Pilet 
& William P. Cross eds., 2014) (describing “an “era in which norms of participatory 
democratization were gaining strength in many countries”).  
 186. See Anika Gauja, The ‘Push’ for Primaries: What Drives Party Organisational Reform in 
Australia and the United Kingdom?, 47 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 641, 653–54 (2012) (discussing 
examples). 
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processes of displacement, can still be stable institutions.187  They might be 
able to survive.   
In contrast, the next and final mechanism of institutional change that I 
focus on is exclusively about a process of change that leads to institutional 
abolishment or institutional death.  In the dynamic captured by the mechanics 
of what has come to be called exhaustion, “behaviors invoked or allowed 
under existing rules operate to undermine” the institution leading to 
“institutional breakdown rather than change.”188  The undermining that is 
characteristic of exhaustion occurs through the demonstration of the 
institution’s disutility.  That it is not in reality fulfilling its goals but is rather 
a burden or an irrelevance.  
Exhaustion includes two additional features worth emphasizing.  First, 
as we have seen in the case of conversion, exhaustion also has either a 
complete or a more nuanced version.  Sometimes the institution’s disutility 
that is characteristic of exhaustion is demonstrated in relation to the entire 
domain or mandate of that institution.  In such a case, exhaustion may 
ultimately lead to this institution’s complete demise.  Sometimes, however, 
the disutility would characterize only parts of what the institution was meant 
to be undertaking.  In these circumstances, the institution will become 
depleted only in part—what some describe as “shrinkage.”189  
Second, processes of exhaustion can take either an active or an inactive 
form.  Inactively, the mere dis-utilization of an institution might be 
considered an example of exhaustion.  The more it is unused, the greater 
chance it will die because it has been essentially forgotten or is simply 
believed to be useless, even unjustified.  Actively, any breach of institutional 
rules may do the same, especially if that breach occurs in circumstances that 
lie at the core of where the institution was meant to work.  The more instances 
of this type accumulate, the greater the likelihood that the institution’s fate 
will be doomed.  
In the literature on gradual transformations of formal institutions, the 
study of exhaustion has focused, for example, on the slow disappearance of 
various social-democratic assisted-labor programs—usually as a case of 
 
 187. Of course, it may be that the complexity brought forth by the layering or the repurposing of 
the institution given processes of drift and conversion will prove untenable to relevant institutional 
stakeholders who will eventually operate to abolish the institution itself.  A Kuhnian “crisis” is a 
relevant example.  See supra note 118.  Perhaps the defection encouraged by displacement will also 
lead to the same result.  But there is no reason to think that this will typically or even primarily be 
the case with all relevant institutions, formal and informal alike.  
 188. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 110, at 29.  
 189. Simon Steinlin & Christine Trampusch, Institutional Shrinkage: The Deviant Case of Swiss 
Banking Secrecy, 62 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 242, 243 (2012) (identifying “shrinkage” as a specific 
variant of the mechanism of exhaustion). 
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active exhaustion.190  For cases of inactive exhaustion, consider what 
Professor Adrian Vermeule describes as constitutional atrophy in the case of 
Section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada, which allows 
the federal legislature to enact statutes in certain constitutional matters 
notwithstanding adverse judicial rulings.191  In Professor Vermeule’s telling, 
the mere fact that this formal power has not been invoked for some time has 
de facto exhausted it, as relevant spectators simply came to believe that it no 
longer has any use or even that it has become illegitimate.192 
Exhaustion seems also to apply in equal force to the context of the 
informal institutions that are constitutional norms.  In fact, exhaustion 
explains much of the concern that stands at the heart of the claims that 
connect norm erosion to a potential trend of democratic decline and 
constitutional retrogression. 
5.1 Active Exhaustion—Democratic Decline in the United States and 
Elsewhere: At home in the United States, the concerns relating to former 
President Trump’s behavior and his recalcitrance, for example, to adhere to 
norms about disclosing his finances or about prosecutorial independence, are 
not just that his conduct is aberrational and that he is disrupting the original 
function of the relevant norms.  If the concerns were only limited to that, the 
worry would be that these constitutional norms are exposed to the process of 
layering.193  This is not the case, however.  Rather, what ignites the concern 
about President Trump and about those who “resist”194 him and the tactics 
they use to halt Trump is that by their continued disregard of valuable 
political and constitutional norms, both factions are exhausting valuable 
norms.  In other words, the continued breaches of these norms, if not stopped, 
 
 190. See, e.g., Marius R. Busemeyer & Christine Trampusch, Liberalization by Exhaustion: 
Transformative Change in the German Welfare State and Vocational Training System, 59 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIALREFORM 291 (2013) (examining this case study in terms of the working 
of the mechanism of active exhaustion).  
 191. See Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
421, 425 (2012).  
 192. For completeness I note that recently there were some attempts to invoke Section 33 in the 
Canadian state of Ontario.  For an illuminating discussion, see Janet L. Hiebert, The Charter’s 
Influence on Legislation: Political Strategizing About Risk, Presidential Address to the Canadian 
Political Science Association, Regina, Saskatchewan, May 31, 2018, 51 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 727 
(2018).  In addition, in recent work, U.K. scholar Professor Aileen Kavanagh has challenged the 
common understanding according to which Section 33 of the Canadian Charter has been, in the 
terms used here, inactively “exhausted.”  Instead, Kavanagh claims that it was a deliberate design 
feature of the mechanism of notwithstanding.  See Aileen Kavanagh, Underuse of the Override 
(work-in-progress) (on file with the author). 
 193. See supra Part II.B.I.  
 194. See generally THE RESISTANCE: THE DAWN OF ANTI-TRUMP OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 22 
(David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarow eds., 2018). 
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will end up proving their disutility in ways that would ultimately bring about 
their demise.  
Similar characterizations apply to other behaviors occurring today in the 
United States, specifically in the context of political parties.  When the 
Republican and Democratic Parties in recent years have engaged in the 
practice of legislative obstruction against one another—either related to 
appointments to the executive branch or the judiciary through the tool of the 
filibuster or in other contexts—the concern being raised isn’t merely an issue 
of complicating the relevant norms as in layering.  Rather, what has provoked 
serious concerns is that this type of behavior potentially exhausts norms of 
political fair play195 or of regulated political rivalry.196  It creates a “death 
spiral”197 or brings the prospect of an endless cycle of tit-for-tat between the 
parties.198  
Similar applications of the idea of exhaustion can be carried out in 
relation to events in other jurisdictions that have been claimed to also 
exemplify the global trend of democratic decline, including the United 
Kingdom.199  What the discussion therefore helps flag is that the growing 
concerns that appear today around the erosion of constitutional norms center 
on the mechanism of exhaustion.200  The worry, in other words, is about the 
 
 195. See also Jack Goldsmith, What Was Most Important in Today’s Supreme Court Immigration 
Decision, LAWFARE (June 26, 2017, 10:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-was-most-
important-todays-supreme-court-immigration-decision. 
 196. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES 
AND PARTISANSHIP 121 (2008) (invoking Edmund Burke’s idea of regulated rivalry).  
 197. Justin Amash, Our Politics is in a Partisan Death Spiral. That’s Why I’m Leaving the GOP., 
WASH. POST (July 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justin-amash-
our-politics-is-in-a-partisan-death-spiral-thats-why-im-leaving-the-gop/2019/07/04/afbe0480-
9e3d-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html?utm_term=.5eef506d1278.  
 198. Noah Feldman, Don’t Pack the Supreme Court, Democrats. You’d Live to Regret It, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-
28/supreme-court-packing-would-backfire-on-democrats; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra 
note 22, at 211; Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 16. 
 199. See, e.g., Tarunabh Khaitan, On Coups, Constitutional Shamelessness, and Lingchi, U.K. 
CONST. L. ASS’N (Sept. 16, 2019), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/06/tarunabh-khaitan-on-
coups-constitutional-shamelessness-and-lingchi/ (arguing that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s 
decision to prorogue parliament was a significant blow to accepted constitutional norms in the 
United Kingdom on legitimacy of political opposition and parliamentary sovereignty).  Of course, 
as is known, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ultimately resolved that Johnson’s decision 
to prorogue parliament was unconstitutional and that it is within its powers to so declare and order.  
For sympathetic discussion, see Nick Barber, Prorogation, Prerogative, and the Supreme Court, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 3, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/prorogation-prerogative-
and-the-supreme-court/.   
 200. From this perspective, the institutionalist framework fleshed out here seems to help 
disentangle two distinct dynamics that can be suggested via Professors Chafetz and Pozen’s analogy 
to rules/standards bleeding into each other as a process of change.  See Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 
2, at 1437–38.  In one, the issue is of layering, which may lead to institutional change without 
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continued and active demonstration of the disutility of valuable political and 
constitutional norms.   
(5.2) Inactive Exhaustion and Shrinkage—Royal Refusal of Assent and 
the Sewel Convention: Exhaustion, as mentioned previously, can be carried 
out not only actively and completely but also inactively and partially.  And 
although the latter dynamic is of less salience to the contemporary debates 
that focus on democratic decline and constitutional retrogression,201 it is 
nonetheless an important dynamic that should be noted.  
Two examples of inactive exhaustion of constitutional norms from the 
United Kingdom are worth mentioning.  The first relates to the constitutional 
norm that exists there and which affords the Queen the authority to refuse 
legislative assent and thereby deny legislative bills from attaining binding 
status.  Since that power has not been used since the eighteenth century, many 
believe that it has been exhausted and disappeared.202  The second relates to 
the norm in the United Kingdom known as the Sewel Convention, which 
addresses the distribution of powers between the central British legislature 
and devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Though 
the Sewel Convention determines that the central legislature must seek the 
consent of devolved legislatures for legislation in matters that have been 
devolved in the normal course of affairs, “the only significant examples of 
the UK Parliament legislating with regard to devolved matters without 
devolved consent relate to the wholly exceptional circumstances of Northern 
Ireland.”203  Accordingly, it has been suggested that the norm’s scope has, in 
the terms used here, been partially exhausted or has shrunk.204  If used only 
and consistently in what appears like extremely extraordinary circumstances, 
 
necessarily causing institutional “death”; in another, the issue is of exhaustion, which is geared 
precisely toward the latter and focuses on illustrations of disutility.  
 201. Professors Chafetz and Pozen make a further point according to which the fact that some 
cases of norms’ “exhaustion,” in the terms used here, are less conspicuous may be particularly 
dangerous in terms of the relevant norms’ ultimate chances of survival.  Id. at 1445–50.  
 202. Vermeule, supra note 191, at 424 makes this case most explicitly.  I note that during the 
complex politics revolving around Brexit, there have been some pressures on the “exhaustion” of 
the constitutional norm that provides for the Queen’s power to refuse legislative assent.  For a 
moment it seems as though the Queen might utilize this power, after it has lain dormant for so long.  
See John Finnis, Only One Option Remains With Brexit—Prorogue Parliament and Allow Us Out 
of the EU with No-Deal, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/ 
2019/04/01/one-option-remains-brexit-prorogue-parliament-allow-us-
eu/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_tw (arguing that the Queen should employ her power to refuse assent); 
Richard Ekins & Stephen Laws, Stop This Power Grab by MPs or Chaos Governs, TIMES (Mar. 31, 
2019, 1:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/stop-this-power-grab-by-mps-or-chaos-
governs-bnd3nvbzc (same). 
 203. Aileen McHarg, Constitutional Change and Territorial Consent: The Miller Case and the 
Sewel Convention, in THE UK CONSTITUTION AFTER MILLER: BREXIT AND BEYOND 155, 162 
(Mark Elliott et al. eds., 2018) (footnote omitted). 
 204. Id.  
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a reasonable conclusion may be that absent these extraordinary conditions, 
the central legislature must still request consent. 
* * * 
Let me conclude all the foregoing. My goal in this Part has been to 
demonstrate that we can make progress in theorizing processes of 
incremental or evolutionary change in constitutional norms.  To this extent, I 
broke off from the traditional image of norms as equilibriums.  Instead, I 
borrowed from a specific framework used in literature on institutional change 
and identified five mechanisms of change: (1) layering, (2) drift, (3) 
conversion, (4) displacement, and (5) exhaustion.  I also argued that they 
aptly apply in the context of constitutional norms and supplied various 
motivating examples of their working.  
To be sure, my claim is decidedly not that implementing the framework 
I draw on will necessarily be easy.  Indeed—and inevitably—boundary 
questions will arise whereby it would be difficult to identify which 
mechanisms are precisely in play.  After all, reality is much messier than any 
generalization permits—and it may on occasion be unclear whether a 
particular instance of institutional change—including change in norms—is 
actually a case of one particular mechanism over another.205  Moreover, 
processes of institutional change may be complex and involve more than one 
of the aforementioned mechanisms.  A process of change can be initiated by 
one specific mechanism, but later the work leading to change may be 
accomplished by a completely different kind of mechanism.  At times, 
various mechanisms can be at work simultaneously.206  
Nonetheless, the framework available from the study of formal 
institutions does supply a rich repertoire for the analysis of constitutional 
norms’ change.  At its core, each of those mechanisms captures a separate 
dynamic that can plausibly explain and illuminate various processes of 
change that occur in relation to constitutional norms in our political system 
and in other systems as well.  In that sense, the various mechanisms help 
construct something akin to Hart’s idea about rules of change in relation to 
constitutional norms.    
 
 205. As we will see below, this ambiguity might also have important pragmatic implications.  
See infra notes 265–270, 294–299 and accompanying text (discussing “over-framing” and “down-
framing”).  
 206. See van der Heijden, supra note 107, at 240. 
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For ease, the discussion can also be summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 1: Rules of Change for Constitutional Norms 
 




Layering Grafting of rules on 






1. The evolution of 
Congress 
2. The evolution of 




affairs in the U.K. 
2. The norm 
against more than 
two presidential 
terms in the U.S. 




2. The minimum 
wage 
1. Norms on 
“casual vacancy” 
appointments for 
the Senate in 
Queensland, 
Australia 











existing rule (which 
can be done in a 
complete or a more 
nuanced way) 
1. Military units’ 
“mission creep” 
2. The Sherman Act 
1. Norms 
regulating the role 
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Displacement Creation of new 
institutions (or 
awakening of 
dormant ones) that 
encourage defection 
from the previous 
institution 
Financial regulatory 
schemes in the E.U. 
1. The norm on 
state immunity in 
customary 
international law 
2. Norms on 
delivering the 
State of the Union 
3. Norms on 
selecting members 
in political parties 
Exhaustion Demonstrations of 
disutility (which can 
be active or passive 
and can apply to the 




programs in Europe  
2. The atrophy of 




the U.S. and 
around the world 
2. The norm 
empowering the 
Queen to refuse 
legislative assent 
in the U.K. 
3. The Sewel 
Convention in the 
U.K. 
III. “RULES OF ADJUDICATION” FOR CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS  
My perspective in this Article so far has been analytical in nature.  If 
successful, then my argument in Parts I and II may hopefully supply analysts 
interested in constitutional norms analytical tools to study norms, and 
particularly processes of change in constitutional norms, more carefully.  
This Part goes further.  It suggests that the framework developed above 
may also play a more pragmatic role.  More concretely, my claim is that this 
framework also contains the resources for how relevant agents who either 
wish to change constitutional norms that exist in the status quo—which I will 
call constitutional norm entrepreneurs207—or to defend the status quo and 
the norms endemic to it—which I will call constitutional norm anti-
 
 207. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 909; see also Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social 
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 772 (1998).  I note that Professor Robert 
Ellickson develops a distinction between “norm entrepreneurs,” on the one hand, and “opinion 
leaders,” on the other hand.  The former targets particular norms and the latter are generalists.  See 
Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in 
SOCIAL NORMS 35, 53–54 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). 
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preneurs208—can in fact behave to achieve their distinct goals.  In that sense, 
this Part argues that the framework developed in Part II can be thought of not 
only as analytical Hartian rules of change but also as operational Hartian rules 
of adjudication—because it points out the ways in which disputes about 
norms are ultimately adjudicated within politics itself.  
Obviously, the rules of adjudication for constitutional norms I discuss 
in this Part will not operate like the parallel ones that exist in relation to 
formal and in Hart’s terms mature law do.  After all, as we already saw, 
constitutional norms rarely have an authoritative institution in charge of 
adjudicating claims in relation to them.209  It is pointless, therefore, to accept 
the analogy between law and norms in full.   
Nonetheless, the strategies I identify do supply a template for potentially 
successful attempts to manipulate constitutional norms.  They are mid-level 
strategies: located at a higher level than the micro-foundations of norms are 
(e.g., the psychological and behavioral forces that support norms) and at a 
lower level than the macro-foundations of norms are (e.g., the larger political, 
cultural, and economic conditions that support them).210  And, given the 
features of norms as inherently primitive, they are, I believe, simply the best 
we can do—realizing of course that the ultimate success of these strategies 
will depend on political dynamics and the level of political savvy and 
sophistication of those who will employ them. 
Section III.A identifies strategies or rules of adjudication that would be 
of particular relevance for constitutional norm entrepreneurs whereas 
Section III.B turns to the side of constitutional norm anti-preneurs.  
A. Constitutional Norm Entrepreneuring 
Part II introduced five mechanisms of institutional change—layering, 
drift, conversion, displacement, and exhaustion.  I also argued that they apply 
with similar force to explain changes in the informal institutions that are 
constitutional norms, and perhaps norms more generally.  These mechanisms 
seem of particular interest to agents unhappy with the consequences of 
existing constitutional norms.  But how exactly will constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs be able to employ them?  And which of those mechanisms will 
prove most beneficial and in what circumstances?  
 
 208. Bloomfield, supra note 34. 
 209. See supra Part I.A. 
 210. See, e.g., Gary Alan Fine, Enacting Norms: Mushrooming and the Culture of Expectations 
and Explanations, in SOCIAL NORMS 139, 139 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2005) 
(highlighting that literature on norms often take either a micro or a macro perspective, and 
emphasizing the need for mid-level theorization).  
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As it happens, each of the mechanisms of change may prove itself 
relevant to different types of norm entrepreneurs and in different 
circumstances. 
1. Subversive Layering 
When the relevant constitutional norm is relatively robust, the 
mechanism of layering seems particularly apt.  Given that it does not entail 
abolishing what had previously been in place but rather introducing 
something new, sophisticated norm entrepreneurs can achieve through 
layering what they could not have achieved otherwise.  They can, for 
example, suggest that what they are doing is not a breach of a previous norm 
or a full-blown reinterpretation but rather an exception to it.  Alternatively, 
they can imply that they are again, not breaching, but only making the 
relevant constitutional norm more complex and nuanced in ways that 
supposedly adapt it to changed circumstances or new realities.  In this way, 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs can escape the costs that might be 
associated with more direct and explicit attempts to override the relevant 
norm while maintaining hope that the ultimate result of their layering will 
subversively change the norm in a more long-term way.211  
Subversive layering in this way is far from unheard of. It can be found 
in both its forms in the process that transpired in relation to the constitutional 
norm that prohibited more than two presidential terms. Indeed, some of 
FDR’s supporters suggested at the time that his election for a third term 
would not break the norm but would rather be an exceptional state that would 
not persist afterward.212 Others, by contrast, emphasized that FDR’s election 
to a third term meant only that the norm had become more qualified rather 
than full-blown shattered.213 Both agents could be understood as subversively 
layering the relevant constitutional norm that supposedly existed in our 
system in the past. 
2. Parasitical Drift 
At first blush, drift does not seem to be a deliberate change strategy 
norm entrepreneurs can use.  After all, as previously discussed,214 drift is in 
an important respect an inactive process in which institutions do not change 
 
 211. See Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 26 (discussing subversion through layering). 
 212. See KORZI, supra note 51, at 133.  
 213. See Jaconelli, supra note 54, at 33.  Professors Chafetz and Pozen’s “axes of instability” 
suggest further moves that could be made in this direction of “layering.”  See Chafetz & Pozen, 
supra note 2, at 1438–45.  
 214. See supra Part II.B.II. 
  
2021] CONSTITUTIONAL NORM ENTREPRENEURING 935 
 
while the circumstances do.  However, there may in fact be circumstances in 
which drift can serve in this more strategic, even active, role.  
Consider a society that reveres certain constitutional norms.  Suppose 
moreover that changes have occurred in the environment around these norms 
and that these changes make that reverence problematic.  Finally, suppose 
that some observers are aware of this problem and advocate for change and 
detachment from the reverence.  Constitutional norm entrepreneurs, who 
favor the status quo and the way in which the norms have ultimately 
developed, can in fact operate to further entrench this conventional or norm-
based status quo.  They may latch onto these norms like parasites and engage 
in actions to increase the likelihood of the freeze.215  And they may do so 
relatively easily because their action will not be viewed—certainly 
superficially—as conflicting with the relevant norm.  In all likelihood, these 
parasitical norm entrepreneurs will accuse the other side of attempting to 
breach and thus increase the reverence for the status quo.   
As discussed in Part II, situations in which constitutional norms are 
exposed to drift are likely going to be tricky to identify in reality and highly 
controversial.  But as the examples discussed there also suggest, drift should 
not be ruled out.  Some supporters of the “responsible party government” 
movement certainly thought that those who confronted them and celebrated 
reverence to “classic[al]” norms of separation of powers could be understood 
as parasites causing drift rather than genuinely preserving norms.216  Today, 
many proponents of the “presidential administration” thesis,217 those with a 
broad view of the permissible scope of the administrative state,218 or those 
critical of the current function of structural constitutional norms in the United 
States more broadly,219 could similarly be understood as accusing their 
opponents who advocate for a classical understanding of separation of 
powers norms as leaching onto these norms like parasites and trying to freeze 
them to advance their own contemporary values (rather than for the sake of 
genuinely preserving these norms).220  
 
 215. See Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 18–20 (discussing parasitical drift). 
 216. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, FOREIGN AFFS. (Fall 1980), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1980-09-01/form-government.  
 217. See Kagan, supra note 155. 
 218. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term—Foreword: 
1930s Redux: The Administrative State under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 219. See LEVINSON, supra note 156.  
 220. In Professor Adrian Vermeule’s account, these values are either one form or another of 
libertarianism or legalism.  See VERMEULE, supra note 218, at 23. 
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3. Opportunistic Conversion 
Conversion seems like an appealing strategy for constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs facing a more plastic constitutional norm than that associated 
with layering—like constitutional norms in the form that resembles legal 
standards or, as international relations scholars describe it, “meta norms”.221  
Rather than simply breach or directly attack the present meaning or sense of 
the constitutional norm in question, norm entrepreneurs can engage in 
attempts to repurpose it via reinterpretation.  In this way, constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs appear to be adhering to the dictates of the constitutional norm 
even though they are opportunistically engaged in changing it through 
interpretation or deployment toward new goals, or in rearranging its 
priorities.222  
An example of this strategy can be found in the context of the evolution 
in the position of the American presidency in the constitutional order, 
discussed above.223  When Progressives began to reimagine the institution of 
the presidency in the United States, one of their main claims was not that the 
new role they were hoping to create for this institution was unconstitutional 
and in direct conflict with its original purposes.  Rather, they claimed that the 
Constitution is a living document that requires dynamic interpretation—
including in the sense of the relevant constitutional norms that supplement 
the formal document and regulate the presidency’s position within the larger 
constitutional scheme.224  
4. Competitive Displacement 
Displacement as a mechanism seems primarily attractive in cases in 
which constitutional norm entrepreneurs cannot affect the relevant 
constitutional norm directly but can instead rely on the logic of competition 
and then defection.  This may be most useful when constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs cannot access the norms in question, for example, because they 
are not part of the audiences these norms speak to or regulate directly or 
because they are not members in the relevant institution wherein the norm 
applies.  In these cases, constitutional norm entrepreneurs can nonetheless 
capture other institutions that operate in parallel to those they wish to 
influence, introduce a new norm into them, and then hope for the defection 
 
 221. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 222. See Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, at 28. 
 223. See supra notes 163–170 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A 
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2075, 2078–79 
(2009). 
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that may ensue.225  This is one interpretation for what happened in the context 
of the change to the norms governing the selection process in political parties.  
The relevant constitutional norm entrepreneurs were successful in initiating 
the change to direct leadership primaries in one specific party, or jurisdiction, 
and the others followed suit and mimicked it, defecting from their previous, 
more elite-focused leadership selection process.226  
Sometimes, though, these constitutional norm entrepreneurs can 
introduce a new norm within the same institution that will operate in tandem 
with the previous one and then hope for the same dynamic of competition 
and ultimate defection to occur.  For instance, Woodrow Wilson could be 
described as a constitutional norm entrepreneur who, by awakening the 
dormant practice of delivering the State of the Union orally, operated as a 
displacer of the previous constitutional norm that directed that the State of 
the Union should be delivered in writing.227  Indeed, ever since Wilson 
rekindled the old practice of delivering the State of the Union in person, all 
other presidents followed suit; they deserted the previous constitutional norm 
of doing so in writing.  The revival of the old norm competed with the present 
one so successfully that it made the previously effective norm dormant and 
the previously dormant norm effective. 
An additional contemporary example of competitive displacement in the 
United States is the campaign for conscientious electors, which tries to 
resurrect the dormant practice of independent voting in the Electoral College.  
Today, the constitutional norm is to vote “faithfully,” in accordance with the 
wishes of those who put the electors in place.  Among the main strategies this 
campaign adopted is to convince enough electors to adhere to the previously 
dormant, now awakened, practice of independent electoral voting, that others 
will similarly defect from the contemporary constitutional norm that directs 
presidential electors to vote faithfully.228  
5. Insurrectionary Exhaustion 
Through all of these, constitutional norm entrepreneurs can try to effect 
change in the relevant constitutional norms they are directing.  But of course, 
some constitutional norm entrepreneurs are not really interested in simply 
changing the content of constitutional norms and leave it at that.  At times, 
 
 225. For the claim that such a dynamic also explains other important dynamics in constitutional 
matters, see Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3–4 (2014) (identifying competition, learning, and acculturation as important 
drivers of constitutional rights’ diffusion worldwide). 
 226. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 228. For a critical discussion, see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional 
Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903 (2017).  
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constitutional norm entrepreneurs want to bring about the expiration of 
specific norms. And when they can do so without incurring too many costs, 
or when these costs are worthwhile for them, they can engage in what we 
have seen is entailed by the mechanism of exhaustion; they can become, in 
other words, insurrectionary exhausters of constitutional norms.  More 
specifically, what constitutional norm entrepreneurs can do is engage in 
practices that constantly emphasize the disutility of the relevant 
constitutional norm, either by breaching it and demonstrating that it is not 
fulfilling its goals or is obstructing the achievement of other more valuable 
goals—in the case of active exhaustion—or by simply guaranteeing that the 
norm is forgotten—in the case of inactive exhaustion.229  
As discussed earlier, this may be the exact same dynamic that has been 
occurring in the context of norms of political fair play in various systems, 
including the United States.230  President Trump, his supporters, and his 
resisters are all in this sense exhausting the relevant constitutional norms 
through repeated demonstration of their disutility.  The campaign for 
conscientious electors can also be read in part as an attempt to exhaust the 
existing constitutional norm that directs electors to vote in a faithful way.  In 
addition to attempts to try to resurrect a dormant practice of independent 
voting by electors and encourage electors to defect to that resurrected 
practice, as in competitive displacement, those who are pushing the campaign 
are constantly engaged in what we can understand as attempts to actively 
exhaust the current norm that regulates presidential electors’ voting—
emphasizing how the current constitutional norm that locks in electors’ 
choices blocks the attainment of more valuable practices.  Among other 
things, they attack the legitimacy of the Electoral College—including by 
suggesting that it was a “pro-slavery” ploy231—and point to various ways in 
which the norm brings forth extremely unattractive results, most recently, in 
their eyes: the election of President Trump.232  
B. Constitutional Norm Anti-Preneuring 
Constitutional norm entrepreneurs are not the only beneficiaries, so to 
speak, of the framework developed in this Article.  Whenever such 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs exist, we are also likely to find 
constitutional norm anti-preneurs seeking to achieve exactly the opposite 
 
 229. For ways that constitutional norm entrepreneurs can achieve that see infra, note 287 and 
accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 195–198 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Akhil Reed Amar, Actually, the Electoral College Was a Pro-Slavery Ploy, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-college-slavery.html. 
 232. For an extremely effective survey of current controversies, see Whittington, supra note 228. 
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goal and to safeguard contemporary norms.  And much like the identification 
of the relevant mechanisms by which constitutional norms change can help 
norm entrepreneurial work, so too may it assist the contrary maintenance 
work233 that constitutional norm anti-preneurs perform.  Moreover, for each 
mechanism that may possibly be engaged by norm entrepreneurs, norm anti-
preneurs can devise an appropriate response.234 
1. Counter-Layering 
If constitutional norm anti-preneurs identify subversive layering as the 
process of change that is being attempted by their norm entrepreneurial 
opponents, constitutional norm anti-preneurs can potentially engage in 
counter-layering—creating exceptions or new rules that either cancel the 
layer introduced by the norm entrepreneurs or simply weaken and water-
down235 its overall effect on the constitutional norm.236  Though norm 
entrepreneurs might have enough political clout to “layer” and can disguise 
their desires to bring forth change in the prevailing norms by minimizing the 
actions these norm entrepreneurs take, constitutional norm anti-preneurs can 
take advantage of the fact that this clout does not permit more significant 
inroads into the existing norms.   
As an example of this, consider that when the U.K. government lost the 
vote that led Prime Minister David Cameron to acknowledge the change as 
to the extent of the government’s prerogative power in military affairs, as we 
saw earlier,237 he immediately added that the new meaning did not suggest 
that there is no scope at all for an absolute prerogative.238 This “counter-
layer” in fact persists until today, as the United Kingdom government 
consistently insists that there is a domain of the prerogative that is free from 
parliamentary monitoring.239  
 
 233. See Thomas Lawrence & Roy Suddaby, Institutions and Institutional Work, in SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 215, 229 (Steward R. Clegg, et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006).  
 234. For the claim that there are similarities between the strategies used by various kinds of what 
is, in the terms used here, norm entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs, see generally CLIFFORD BOB, THE 
GLOBAL RIGHT WING AND THE CLASH OF WORLD POLITICS (2012). 
 235. Fredrik Engelstad, Property Rights, Governance, and Power Balances, in COOPERATION 
AND CONFLICT THE NORDIC WAY: WORK, WELFARE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
SCANDINAVIA 36, 38 (Fredrik Engelstad & Anniken Hagelund eds., 2015) (emphasis omitted). 
 236. I note that this strategy has strong affinities with scholarship discussing the implications of 
the general theory of the second best to constitutional politics.  See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s 
Second Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003) (discussing the general implications 
of the theory of the second best to constitutional theory). 
 237. See supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Lagassé, supra note 122, at 230. 
 239. See Mills, supra note 119, at 30; see generally Strong, supra note 121. 
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2. Politics of Unfreezing 
If used by norm entrepreneurs, drift calls for an altogether different 
response by norm anti-preneurs.  Rather than oppose what superficially 
seems like norm change, they should rather forcefully encourage it, as the 
change is actually what is required to deliver the goals the norm was 
originally meant to achieve.  Constitutional norm anti-preneurs therefore 
must engage in those cases in what we can think of as a politics of 
unfreezing,240 which is aimed at relaxing whatever reverence the norm 
attaches to it or dislodging the inertial “rust” that the norm has accumulated 
through time.241  
In many ways, the work of Professor Sanford Levinson, which 
persistently—even obsessively—points out possible ways in which 
venerating norms affects our understandings of the Constitution serves as a 
good example of what politics of unfreezing entails both at the level of 
political rhetoric and institutional reform.242  Similar examples in the same 
vein can be found in the writing of scholars such as Daniel Lazare,243 Louis 
Michael Seidman,244 Aziz Rana,245 and Mark Tushnet.246  
3. Politics of Fidelity  
When constitutional norm anti-preneurs identify that the process of 
change being engaged in by relevant norm entrepreneurs is opportunistic 
 
 240. Kurt Lewin, Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method, and Reality in Social 
Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change, 1 HUM. RELS. 5, 7 (1947) (describing the importance 
of “unfreezing” in institutional reform). 
 241. Id.; see also William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735 (1949) 
(“Social forces like armies can sweep around a fixed position and make it untenable.”) 
 242. See LEVINSON, supra note 156.  At the level of rhetoric, Levinson constantly emphasizes 
the “false necessities” that underlie our constitutional assumptions.  At the level of institutional 
action, Levinson is an avid supporter of a new constitutional convention to amend the Constitution.  
See id. at 254. 
 243. See DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: HOW THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING 
DEMOCRACY (1996). 
 244. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
 245. See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Goodbye, Cold War, 30 N+1: MOTHERLAND (2018), 
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-30/politics/goodbye-cold-war/. 
 246. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, “Our Perfect Constitution” Revisited, in TERRORISM, THE LAWS 
OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES 131, 131 (Peter 
Berkowitz ed., 2005).  I note, though, that there is a difference in the extent that these scholars are 
willing to engage in what I describe as politics of unfreezing.  Professor Sanford Levinson’s 
approach seems to be limited to what he describes as the norms regulating the “constitution of 
conversation” and not to the norms included in what he calls the “constitution of settlement.”  See 
LEVINSON, supra note 156, at 246–54.  Other scholars seem to go further, however, and advance 
unfreezing also within what Levinson understands as the “constitution of settlement.”  See, e.g., 
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009). 
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conversion, the anti-preneurial maintenance work should include actions that 
resist any potential for norm creep.  One particular way to do so is to engage 
in politics of fidelity so as to highlight how the attempt to convert the norm 
is hostile to the institution’s original purposes.247  
A case in point is of course the reaction to the growth and conversion of 
the role of the presidency in the United States.  When the institution of the 
American presidency had begun to change during the Progressive Era, one 
source of effective critique was originalist in tone and style—which clearly 
exemplifies this type of strategy.248  Similarly, a politics of fidelity can be 
identified in legislative responses to the United States Supreme Court’s 
perceived erroneous interpretations of “super-statutes.”249  Given that these 
super-statutes are believed to reflect a more significant level of societal 
acceptance and, in fact, a constitutional norm, overruling Supreme Court 
interpretations that seem to go against the dictates of the norm was often 
given a special label: the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987250 (emphasis 
added)—so as to signal not only the overturning of the precedent via 
legislation but also the resilience of the constitutional norm. 
4. Sheltering 
In yet another option, when the source of change is the mechanism of 
displacement, constitutional norm anti-preneurs need to engage in another 
complicated task.  Very much like overprotecting parents, they ought to 
eliminate possibilities for temptations—by closing and “shelter[ing]” the 
relevant institutions from outside opportunities and information, by 
 
 247. The metaphor of fidelity is of course strong in the constitutional culture in the United States.  
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); JACK BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM 8–9 (2011).  But it is familiar in other contexts too, which exemplify the 
general import of the idea of politics of fidelity and its potential effectivity to constitutional norm 
anti-preneuring.  See, e.g., Kim Jonker & William F. Meehan, Curbing Mission Creep, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. 60, 61 (Winter 2008), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/curbing_mission_ 
creep# (discussing the importance of fidelity to “mission statements” in order to curb the tendency 
of organizations, and especially non-governmental organizations, for mission creep).  
 248. See, e.g., JAMES BURNHAM, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1959).  It may be 
worth mentioning that in the United Kingdom, most critical reactions to the conversion of the role 
of the prime minister into a significant domestic policy role were also “traditional[ist],” in the sense 
of emphasizing the ways in which the conversion stands in contrast to this role’s original function 
as it had been crystallized in constitutional norms.  See DENNIS KAVANAGH & ANTHONY SELDON, 
THE POWERS BEHIND THE PRIME MINISTER: THE HIDDEN INFLUENCE OF NUMBER 10, at 76 (2000); 
PETER HENNESSY, THE PRIME MINISTER: THE OFFICE AND ITS HOLDERS SINCE 1945, at 538 
(2001).   
 249. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).  
 250. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
  
942 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:881 
 
increasing the costs of defection, or by eliminating and delegitimizing 
dormant practices.251  
As an example, consider that during the Prohibition Era “the forces in 
favor of prohibition never wanted any objective check on public sentiment.  
They tried to kill off straw polls on the subject of prohibition.”252  And indeed, 
that sheltering tactic seemed to have worked, at least for a while: “As a 
consequence of their tactics even the politicians were fooled by an illusion of 
universality of opinion in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment.”253  
5. Blaming, Demonizing and Valorizing, Over-Framing 
When constitutional norm anti-preneurs face constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs who engage in the process of exhaustion and have the direct 
aim of bringing forth the relevant constitutional norms’ demise, the best 
course of action for the former is to operate in ways that highlight the utility 
of the relevant norms and simultaneously make the further acts of exhaustion 
costly.  This, of course, entails respecting the relevant constitutional norms, 
a point to which I will return further below in Part IV.254  But it also involves 
calling out norm entrepreneurs for what they are doing, including by 
effectively characterizing them as norm flouters and breachers.   
Much of our contemporary constitutional politics, around President 
Trump, his resistors, and the Democratic and Republican parties, is obviously 
a living example of calling out norm breakers and identifying them as such, 
though the efficacy of this is questionable. as I discuss in Part IV).255  For an 
example taken from a different time, consider the following: Prior to the 
passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, those who believed that vice 
presidents cannot succeed the full office of the presidency should a president 
die while in office kept resisting Vice President John Tyler’s attempt to fully 
succeed deceased President William Henry Harrison by constantly calling 
him “Acting President” or, even more vividly, “His Accidency.”256 
 
 251. See, e.g., Hannah Rosin, The Overprotected Kid, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/hey-parents-leave-those-kids-
alone/358631/ (discussing strategies used by parents to halt change in norms regarding 
playgrounds).  
 252. DANIEL KATZ  & RICHARD L. SCHANCK, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1938).  
 253. Id. 
 254. In social psychology, it is accepted that to strengthen norms, one important move is “to 
highlight the direction and uniformity of the group’s behavior.”  See Deborah A. Prentice, The 
Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL 
ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 35 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods 
eds., 2012). 
 255. See infra Part IV.B.  
 256. I draw this example from Michael J. Gerhardt, Nonjudicial Precedents, in THE POWER OF 
PRECEDENT 113–16 (2008). 
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But calling out breachers in this way may prove harder to do than first 
meets the eye.  A crucial complication constitutional norm anti-prenuers may 
face in their attempt to resist exhaustion of constitutional norms is that norm 
entrepreneurs may try to deny that they have any personal responsibility or 
agency for exhausting relevant norms.257   
To overcome this challenge, constitutional norm anti-preneurs may be 
able to create credible narratives of causation that connect the relevant 
players to the breaches directly, or, in other words, to create narratives of 
blaming.258  The effectiveness of this strategy has clear antecedents.  For 
instance, in the campaign preceding FDR’s third term, FDR’s opponents 
were at pains to counter the narrative that FDR and his supporters were 
advancing, according to which an additional term was inevitable because of 
the exigent circumstances and that FDR had only begrudgingly agreed to run 
because he was approached and asked to do so.259  Rather, they emphasized 
that FDR had actively and personally chosen to do so.  Specifically, FDR’s 
Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, referred to FDR consistently 
throughout the presidential campaign as “Mr. Third-Term Candidate.”260  
Beyond this, there could be further ways to bolster attempts to fight off 
constitutional norm exhaustion by norm entrepreneurs.  One particular 
strategy that constitutional norm anti-preneurs could adopt is that of 
“[v]alo[]rizing and demonizing.”261  Demonizing is directed toward 
dramatizing the negative consequences that have ensued from the acts of 
norm flouting.  For example, it has been suggested that a rhetoric of disdain 
or, in the terms used here, “demonization,” toward FDR’s failed court-
packing plan is what explains the relative robustness of the constitutional 
norm against “[c]ourt[]packing” in the United States.262  In contrast, 
valorizing entails exaggerating the norm’s effectivity and utility; it is 
 
 257. In most cases, this would be easy to do given the nature of norms, as we saw in Parts I and 
II, as complicated institutions or equilibriums that may downplay individual responsibility.  As a 
comparison, consider the difficulty of criticizing individual judges, given the nature of courts as 
collective institutions.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 802, 823 (1982).   
 258. For an extremely useful exploration of the effectiveness of narratives of causation in related 
matters, see Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. 
Q. 281 (1989). 
 259. For Roosevelt’s portrayal of his running for a third term begrudgingly, see KORZI, supra 
note 51, at 87–91, 95–100 (discussing how “heavily invested Roosevelt was . . . in the idea that he 
was truly drafted by the [Democratic Convention] and that he was merely responding to the will of 
the people”). 
 260. See id. at 91–92. 
 261. See Lawrence & Suddaby, supra note 233, at 232–40; see also Roy Suddaby & Royston 
Greenwood, Rhetorical Strategy of Legitimacy, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 49 (2005). 
 262. See Grove, supra note 100, at 531–32. 
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something like cheerleading on steroids.263  Some of the reactions to the 
specter of norm erosion in the context of democratic decline have this kind 
of valorizing character when they emphasize the importance and value of 
democratic norms while glossing over the many problematic results that they 
brought about—like enabling racism or other “rotten [political] 
compromises”264—or when they exaggerate the positive results stemming 
from judicial review.265  In addition, valorization as a strategy of 
constitutional norm maintenance sometimes seems to appear in writing that 
celebrates contemporary separation-of-power norms in the United States.266 
To be sure, constitutional norm anti-preneurs can engage in these 
practices not only when norm entrepreneurs engage in exhaustion as such.  
To further increase the costs associated with change of norms that they wish 
to protect, norm anti-preneurs can frame—or, more accurately, over-frame—
attempts at layering, conversion, drift, and displacement as in essence 
occasions of exhaustion.  Indeed, constitutional norm anti-preneurs need not 
accept the world as it is; they should keep “continually poking and pushing 
the world to get the result they want.”267  
One way to effectively achieve this is by supposedly “peeking” behind 
the veil and claiming that the real intentions of norm entrepreneurs are to 
completely exhaust the relevant norms, rather than to more subtly change 
them by virtue of layering, conversion, etc.268  Another way may be to resort 
to “slippery slope” or precautionary rhetoric—of the “better-safe-than-sorry” 
kind—that dramatizes the consequences of more subtle changes pushed 
through by norm entrepreneurs.269  Finally, constitutional norm anti-preneurs 
 
 263. Cheerleading is the term used by Professor Robert Ellickson to capture support for norms 
of a particular kind.  See Ellickson, supra note 207, at 45.  
 264. See Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 2, at 1445 n.57 (quoting Aziz Huq, Conventions as a 
Consequence of the Incomplete Nature of Constitutional Bargains 4–5 (2018) (unpublished 
manuscript)). 
 265. See Mark Tushnet, Expanding the Judiciary, the Senate Rules, and the Small-C 
Constitution, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/expanding-
judiciary-senate-rules-and.html (remarking that the “view held by many of my Democratic-leaning 
academic colleagues, that there is still enough legitimacy left [of the Supreme Court] to worry about 
a further loss [in that legitimacy], seems to me a triumph of hope over experience”). 
 266. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor 
Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 
(2001). 
 267. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 142 (1986).  Another relevant 
source for this sort of perspective about politics is, of course, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE 
RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991). 
 268. For a discussion of the challenges entailed in understanding the real intentions of 
contemporary political leaders, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 
545 (2018). 
 269. Professor Albert Hirschman called this the “Imminent-Danger Thesis.”  See HIRSCHMAN, 
supra note 267, at 149–54.  
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can abate attempts at norm entrepreneuring by shifting the level of 
generalization with which they would describe the relevant constitutional 
norm.270  To take a concrete example, constitutional norm anti-preneurs may 
be able to say that although the specific rules around the use of the Senate 
filibuster have not been breached,271 or have only been layered, a higher-level 
norm regarding political fair play might indeed have been breached by the 
constant filibuster obstruction, a familiar language in this context may be 
reference to the real “spirit” of the relevant constitutional norm.272  
6. Formalization: Hard and Soft 
Thus far I have highlighted strategies that correspond to the ones that 
could potentially be used by constitutional norm entrepreneurs.  However, 
two additional strategies seem to go beyond this correlation and might likely 
be particularly appealing to constitutional norm anti-preneurs.  
The first strategy involves an attempt to formalize present constitutional 
norms, to move them from the realm of the informal, in which they are 
usually situated, to that of the formal.   
Formalization can come in two forms: hard or soft.  Hard formalization 
occurs when formalization is meant to give the norms the full force of law.  
The logic here is that by transforming informal constitutional norms into 
formalized constitutional—or even sub-constitutional—law, the system of 
law and its relevant enforcement agents—especially courts and lawyers—
may effectively assist in enforcing the relevant constitutional norms and 
better protecting them.  For example, in the debates that arose because of 
President Trump’s interference with the criminal procedures conducted by 
the Department of Justice,273 and contrary to established constitutional norms 
that secure this independence,274 one of the key proposals suggested in 
response takes exactly the direction of hard formalization: giving DOJ’s 
independence a statutory footing.275  
 
 270. This is of course an issue familiar to the law.  See Adam M. Samaha, Levels of Generality, 
Constitutional Comedy, and Legal Design, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733 (2013). 
 271. This view is presented in Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change 
Written Constitutions, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 387, 399 (2015). 
 272. For further illustrations of this rhetorical strategy, see Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 110, 
at 24; Whittington, supra note 2, at 1860.  
 273. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Sharon LaFraniere & Nicole Hong, Fearful of Trump’s Attacks, 
Justice Dept. Lawyers Worry Barr Will Leave them Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/us/politics/trump-barr-justice-
department.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.  
 274. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 36, at 2207–15. 
 275. See Cass R. Sunstein, Imagine that Donald Trump Has No Control over Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/trump-barr-justice-
department.html?referringSource=articleShare.  For the potential constitutional difficulties that this 
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But formalization can take a softer form as well.  This occurs when the 
relevant existing constitutional norms are simply put down in writing even 
without pretensions to go through the relevant procedures that would give the 
formalized document the full force of law.  
Soft formalization of constitutional norms is far from unheard of.276  In 
the United States, various kinds of attempts to formalize political norms—
some of them have constitutional pedigree—have been documented.277  In 
Westminster systems, the formalization of constitutional norms is a growing 
trend and has attracted significant political and academic attention.278  
Though the formalization is only soft, it has important potential benefits 
for constitutional norm anti-preneurs.  For one thing, soft formalization 
increases the cognitive salience of current constitutional norms and shields 
them from some of the risks associated with inactive exhaustion —given the 
potential to simply forget un-utilized constitutional norms.279  For another, 
the existence of a formalized document containing the contours of the 
relevant constitutional norms can also establish a sort of veto point or a 
slowing-down mechanism in favor of constitutional norm anti-preneurs, 
especially if the existence of a formal document contributes to the creation 
of a separate norm, according to which when issues are raised that potentially 
engage formalized norms, their formalized expression must be consulted.280  
 
proposal faces, see Josh Blackman, Trump Has the Constitutional Power to Intervene in Roger 
Stone’s Sentencing, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/ 
02/19/trump-has-constitutional-power-intervene-roger-stones-sentencing/.  I note that this proposal 
to formalize DOJ’s independence is only the most recent in a growing flurry of proposals to 
formalize constitutional norms in “hard” ways that have been on the agenda since former President 
Trump assumed office.  For suggestions involving increased judicial role in enforcing constitutional 
norms, see Renan, supra note 36, at 2265–73; Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 5.  
 276. See, e.g., Jacob Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 574 (2008). 
 277. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Independence and Accountability at the Department of Justice, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/independence-and-accountability-
department-justice. 
 278. See Andrew Blick, The Cabinet Manual and the Codification of Conventions, 67 
PARLIAMENTARY AFFS. 191, 202, 205 (2014); Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Proceduralism 
and Automation: Challenges to the Values of Administrative Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND 
FUTURE OF PUBLIC LAW (IN HONOUR OF PAUL CRAIG) 3 (Elisabeth Fisher, Jeff King & Allison 
Young eds., 2019) (commenting that they “also note a tendency in recent times to formalise parts 
of soft law . . . in published documents”). 
 279. See Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 319, 
326–29 (1988) (discussing the importance of formalization of experience to the persistence of 
organizational learning).  
 280. I draw this idea of a norm about consulting written norms from Professor Nicholas Barber.  
See BARBER, supra note 26, at 100.  
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Finally, and following E. E. Schattschneider’s insight that “the outcome 
of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion,”281 soft 
formalization can be understood as a strategy of contagion: it may attract to 
the field of contestation about constitutional norms other players who would 
not have otherwise been involved with it.  Indeed, one explanation often 
offered for the trend of formalization of constitutional norms in Westminster 
is that they are geared toward involving courts in the adjudication of 
constitutional norm-related conflicts.282  More broadly, formalizing 
constitutional norms in a soft manner may call for greater involvement by 
lawyers who may claim a privileged position in interpreting the relevant 
official documents—even if those documents are not hard law.  To the extent 
that courts and lawyers might be allies of constitutional norm anti-preneurs, 
soft formalization could therefore be perceived as a way of pulling them into 
the field of contestation.283 
7. Memory Entrepreneuring 
A final strategy for constitutional norm anti-preneurs worth flagging 
relates to what a growing literature in international relations has identified as 
memory entrepreneurs.  These kinds of entrepreneurial memory agents 
operate in various ways to sustain narratives of memory that serve these 
agents’ goals, as if they are self-appointed “missionaries of historical 
truth.”284  
Constitutional norm anti-preneurs can embrace similar strategies to 
enhance the salience of the norms they seek to defend.  Such strategies of 
memory entrepreneuring can help constitutional norm anti-preneurs make 
sure that constitutional norms that are rarely, or at least irregularly, practiced 
will remain very much alive in relevant audiences’ memories.  Moreover, this 
 
 281. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2 (1960).  
 282. See, e.g., Blick, supra note 278, at 202. 
 283. This, I believe, is more than possible given how law is, in important respects, retrospective: 
it ought to address the past and build on it, for example, in its focus on “preexisting” rights and in 
its increased reliance on doctrines such as stare decisis.  See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 36–61 (2009).  For the 
locus classicus on this, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353 (1978). 
 284. See Dovile Budryte, Traumatic Memory and Its Production in Political Life: A Survey of 
Approaches and a Case Study 9 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (cited with permission from 
author), https://www.academia.edu/3094290/Traumatic_Memory_and_Its_Production_in_ 
Political_Life_A_Survey_of_Approaches_and_a_Case_Study; see also Elsa Abou Assi, Collective 
Memory and Management of the Past: The Entrepreneurs of Civil War Memory in Post-War 
Lebanon, 61 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 399, 401 (2010); ROBYN AUTRY, DESEGREGATING THE PAST: THE 
PUBLIC LIFE OF MEMORY IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 27–65 (2017).  
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strategy can enhance the existence and livelihood of contemporary norms, 
even if practiced regularly, by highlighting them even further—so that they 
can achieve a level of “cognitive hegemony”285—or by minimizing events 
that might disrupt them.286  For example, Tara Leigh Grove has suggested 
that part of the reason a norm of compliance with federal court orders has 
proven robust in the United States is because instances of defying federal 
court orders have been forgotten and have disappeared from our collective 
memory in light activities we can understand as memory entrepreneuring 
(specifically, the way these events have gone unmentioned in relevant legal 
casebooks).287 
* * * 
A summary of the various strategies or “rule of adjudication” for 
constitutional norms discussed in this Part can be captured in the following 
tables: 
 
Table 2: Constitutional Norm Entrepreneuring 
 












like norms  
Changing the 
norms against two 
presidential terms 
Parasitical Drift Leaching to previous 
norms like parasites 
and attempting to 
freeze change  











 285. For the use of this term, see Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1190 (emphasis omitted).  
 286. A strategy memory entrepreneurs can employ is that of “mythologiz[ation”],” which is 
characterized by “[p]reserving the normative underpinnings of an institution by creating and 
sustaining myths regarding its history.”  See Lawrence & Suddaby, supra note 233, at 230.  
 287. See Grove, supra note 100, at 531–32; see also Chafetz, supra note 15, at 130.  I note, 
however, that memory entrepreneuring is more neutral than that.  It may also be of service to norm 
entrepreneurs.  For example, norms’ displacers who seek to resurrect dormant practices may resort 
to similar strategies to wash away as much as possible the baggage that characterizes the practice in 
light of its period of dormancy.  Professor Grove’s discussion of how the norm that currently allows 
“jurisdiction stripping” is illustrative.  See Grove, supra note 100, at 533–38.  In addition, when 
norm entrepreneurs are only able to operate infrequently, memory entrepreneuring can be useful as 
a way to construct narratives that connect the dots and counter the risk that their actions will be 
viewed as a “wilderness of single instances.”  Jaconelli, supra note 54, at 31.  
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Table 3: Constitutional Norm Anti-Preneuring 
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two presidential 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL NORM ANTI-PRENEURING FOR AN AGE OF 
DEMOCRATIC DECLINE 
Part III was neutral in its outlook.  Its goal was to flesh out the relevant 
strategies on which either constitutional norm entrepreneurs or constitutional 
anti-preneurs can rely to manipulate constitutional norms.  Borrowing from 
H.L.A. Hart, these are akin to constitutional norms’ rules of adjudication. 
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This neutrality, I believe, has good reasons underlying it.  Norms, 
including constitutional norms, can be either good or bad and can be replaced 
for good purposes or bad ones, and it would be hard to judge in the abstract 
which case is which.288  Reasonable minds can also differ.289  This is true as 
a general matter but also more specifically when the relevant norms we are 
focusing on are of the kind captured by “meta norms” or that appear as what 
we would describe in law as an extremely abstract standard.290  As discussed 
previously, these norms allow various forms and applications—and the 
spectrum of reasonableness is likely quite wide.  
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that we live in times in which the 
pressures on constitutional norms, and particularly the ones related to 
political fair play, might bring forth consequences such as a more permanent 
political capture by one political group.291  Though it is too early to tell 
whether this is in fact the case, and whether we truly live in an age of enduring 
democratic decline or constitutional retrogression,292 the mere risk itself—
which in some contexts appears both substantial and credible—merits more 
elaborate thinking about what a specifically defensive program related to 
existing constitutional norms might look like.  
This is the topic of the present Part.  Section IV.A fleshes out one 
potential defensive program that might be relevant to constitutional norm 
anti-preneurs who are interested in preserving and safeguarding existing 
constitutional norms, which we can think of as playing defense.  Section IV.B 
discusses however the relevant limitations of this program and argues that 
these limitations actually apply in the context of the United States.  It then 
briefly develops an alternative program that could be more relevant for 
countries such as the United States, namely a more offensive program with 
regard to norms.  
 
 288. Literature in economics and psychology is divided between what Professor Robert 
Ellickson describes as optimists and pessimists in relation to norms and whether we should think of 
them as good or bad.  See Ellickson, supra note 207, at 54–55.  
 289. My own position is also that there is nothing sacred in norms qua norms.  For similar views, 
see Corey Robin, Democracy Is Norm Erosion, JACOBIN MAG. (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/01/democracy-trump-authoritarianism-levitsky-zillblatt-
norms; Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Normcore, DISSENT (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/normcore-trump-resistance-books-crisis-of-democracy; 
and for a general discussion see Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 2, at 1445–48. 
 290. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 291. See generally LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 22; Issacharoff, supra note 22.  
 292. See Graber, Levinson & Tushnet, supra note 21, at 6; Lührmann & Lindberg, supra note 
74, at 1108 (suggesting that while there is some amount of troubling evidence “it is premature to 
proclaim the ‘end of democracy’ now”).  
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A. Playing Defense 
Constitutional norm anti-preneurs worried about the potential collapse 
of invaluable constitutional norms that seem essential to the continued 
resilience of democratic systems, including norms about political fair play 
and ones that guarantee objective press and civil society, seem desperate for 
a program of defense.   
What would this program look like, though?  
Part of the answer certainly lies in what we have seen in Part III about 
the various tactics constitutional norm anti-preneurs can use in response to 
norm exhaustion.293  As mentioned, these strategies may prove successful in 
maintaining constitutional norms, especially when the norms in question are 
still relatively resilient.  In these situations, the strategies constitutional norm 
anti-preneurs can use may either arouse enough public resentment or simply 
shame norm entrepreneurs into disengaging from their entrepreneurial 
endeavors.  By engaging in active demonstration of the utility of norms, 
including, most importantly, by continuously and un-relentlessly adhering to 
them, constitutional norm anti-preneurs can also resist the temptation that 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs might want to encourage, according to 
which the contemporary status of norms is in flux and that a continuing tit-
for-tat game in relation to these norms is about to be played, which may 
ultimately lead to the norms’ exhaustion. 
These are likely the central and most straightforward components of 
such defensive program in relation to norms. This doesn’t entirely conclude 
the repertoire of choices for constitutional norm anti-preneurs, however.  
There is an additional component that we can add, which originates from the 
world of customary international law, a field that has clear parallels with the 
kind of constitutional norms this Article focuses on.  
Indeed, one of the primary goals of customary international law—which 
regulates rules of the international community that resemble constitutional 
norms—can be understood, in the terms used here, as an attempt to contain 
potential breaches of the relevant rules applicable in this field, which are 
again quite like informal constitutional norms.  The strategy through which 
customary international law achieves this goal is through creating a language 
or “logic” for classifying behavior that allows containment.294  For example, 
in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) case on the matter of Nicaragua, 
it was decided that if a state breaks a rule of customary international law but 
 
 293. See supra Part III.B. 
 294. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in 
Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 394 (2014) 
(quoting Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the 
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 476 (2012)). 
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“defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justification contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather 
than to weaken the rule.”295 
Adopting something like this practice that exists in customary 
international law may be useful in the context of a more defensive program 
regarding constitutional norms and as part of a politics of containment that 
constitutional norm anti-preneurs might want to implement.  It suggests a 
suitable rhetoric of containment.  More specifically, when constitutional 
norm anti-preneurs observe what they view as a breach of a relevant norm 
and attempts at exhausting them, instead of claiming that this may in fact be 
the case, an alternative option would be to “bite the bullet,” or to “count [in]” 
the breaches so as to minimize the breach or make it as immaterial as 
possible, and even confirm it, just like in customary international law.296  If 
in Part III.B we have seen that norm anti-preneurs might want to over-frame, 
in the present context of containment for an age of potential democratic 
decline, an alternative posture of down-framing seems relevant as well—as 
part of a concerted attempt at “reflexive normalization”297 of potential 
breaches of norms.298 
The different rhetorical tools available to achieve this goal are myriad.  
The language of layering noted in Parts II and III is obviously one option, in 
the sense that constitutional norm anti-preneurs can announce breaches to be 
just layers—new rules or exceptions rather than the undermining of the norm.  
In some cases, constitutional norm anti-preneurs can further downplay the 
behavior of the breach by suggesting that despite appearances, the behavior 
that seems to be breaching the norm does not speak to the norm’s general 
validity but only to the norm’s specific application,299 or, in a similar vein, 
they can say that the breach was a permissible, though exceptional, 
 
 295. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27). 
 296. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 866, 871 (1998) (referring to John Searle’s 
idea of trying to create understandings that make a certain behavior “counts as” belonging to certain 
categories rather than not belonging to them as a strategy for sustaining norms (emphasis omitted)); 
see generally JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995). 
 297. Jaco Lok & Mark de Rond, On the Plasticity of Institutions: Containing and Restoring 
Practice Breakdowns at the Cambridge University Boat Club, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 185, 186 (2013). 
 298. Another way to understand this sort of strategy is as sophisticated naiveté, see ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 (2011); or strategic Panglossianism, see 
Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions, and the Perils of Panglossianism, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 635, 644 (2018).  
 299. See Nicole Deitelhoff & Lisbeth Zimmermann, Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different 
Types of Contestation Affect the Validity of International Norms 1 (Peace Rsch. Inst. Frankfurt, 
Working Paper No. 18, 2013), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175046/PRIF_WP_18.pdf.  
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override.300  Finally, constitutional norm anti-preneurs wishing to engage in 
rhetoric of containment may suggest, specifically during times that the breach 
of norms does seem salient and cannot be easily downplayed, that the 
breach’s effects have only temporarily downgraded the norm—from what 
Andrew Heard calls a “meso-level” norm to an “infra-level” norm.301  
B. Playing Offense 
What conditions make this program attractive or feasible, however? 
When should constitutional norm anti-preneurs play defense in this way?  
Two conditions seem particularly important.302  The first is that the 
constitutional norm entrepreneurs who engage in norm breaking possess—at 
the relevant timing—some incentive to be restrained, to belong in other 
words to the “[g]ood people”303 who maintain the current existing norms.304  
After all, only in these circumstances is there a point to applying rhetoric that, 
 
 300. This is, I believe, the broad import from Pozen, supra note 99, at 76–80. 
 301. See ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE MARRIAGE OF 
LAW & POLITICS 150 (1989) (discussing “[m]eso-conventions” and “[i]nfra-conventions”).  For an 
application of this idea, see Barry et al., supra note 102, at 671–72.  In addition, sometimes it may 
be best to ignore the alleged breach altogether.  See, e.g., Joan Donovan & Danah Boyd, The Case 
for Quarantining Extremist Ideas, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2018/jun/01/extremist-ideas-media-coverage-kkk.  For discussion of “prudential 
silence[]” in the context of judging, see VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL ERA 192–94 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Legitimacy and the 
Unwritten Constitution: A Comment on Miranda and Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 139 
(2000). 
 302. The text mentions the two most important conditions for the efficacy of the program, but I 
note briefly another one here, which relates to how the analogy to customary international law is 
imperfect in the context at hand.  After all, in customary international law, some relevant institutions 
address the issue of breaches, which the context of norms is generally lacking.  There is a relatively 
powerful community of international lawyers uniquely devoted to the issue of containment of 
international law norms, which again will be lacking in regard to the norms that regulate our 
constitutional and normal politics (or at least is currently lacking or is only in “building-up” stage).  
Finally, in international law, the rhetoric used for containment is more cohesive and determined, 
and henceforth its signaling effect is more easily served.  It is doubtful that such level could be 
achieved in the more diffuse political world.  
 303. James D. Fearon, What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)? 27 (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/10/What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 
18–21 (discussing how adherence to norms is significantly influenced by the need to illustrate one’s 
belonging to the “good type” rather than to the “bad type”). 
 304. This is true even if that need is purely strategic.  In some scholarship, this is described as 
“rhetorical entrapment.”  See Frank Schimmelfennig, The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, 55 INT’L ORG. 47, 66 
(2001).  In another strand of scholarship, this is more familiar as the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”  
See Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 
349 (2000) (emphasis omitted).  
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as in customary international law, would classify perceived breaches as non-
existential.   
Second, even if the relevant constitutional norm entrepreneurs do not 
have such an incentive, a politics of containment in the ways previously 
described might still be attractive if the constitutional norm anti-preneurs are 
disadvantaged compared with the position of their constitutional norm 
entrepreneurs adversaries, or if the consequences of losing the fight are 
potentially extraordinarily harmful, such as a transition of the political regime 
into some version of authoritarianism (what the literature now calls 
constitutional retrogression or democratic decline).  
Perhaps there are some, even many, jurisdictions in the world where 
these conditions seem to hold.305 It is doubtful, however, that the United 
States is one of those jurisdictions.  
Currently, both sides of the political divide that characterizes 
contemporary constitutional politics in the United States, represented by the 
Republican and the Democratic Parties, have no particular incentive to 
engage in restraint.  And moreover, it is unclear whether restraint is at all 
advisable.  Though it may well be that the United States currently faces a 
period of political regime transition, and some believe that there are risks that 
at the end of this transition, the United States will retrogress into a regime 
outside the project of liberal constitutionalism,306 at this point, the likelihood 
that something like this will transpire still seems quite slim.307  More 
specifically, it appears that what the United States is experiencing is similar 
in nature to the situation described in Part I of the Article, wherein political 
regime transitions ultimately retain important democratic process norms 
(what we can call perhaps an intra-liberal political transition).308  
To that we should add that the various visions fighting for dominance 
within this transition—the vision pursued by the Republican Party and the 
Democratic Party—though not entirely cohesive and fixed at this point, seem 
to be sharply oppositional.  Each party furthermore views the other side’s 
vision as completely repellent.  Levels of polarization also seem so high that 
the two parties are unable to even agree on what the applicable relevant 
constitutional norms are and what they dictate.309 
 
 305. South Korea is a potential case on point.  See, e.g., Gi-Wook Shin & Rennie J. Moon, South 
Korea After Impeachment, 28 DEMOCRACY 117 (2017). 
 306. See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 163–65. 
 307. For a collection of essays that are mostly skeptical of the prospect of constitutional 
retrogression in the United States, see CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018). 
 308. See supra Part I.D. 
 309. See Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional Conventions in U.S. Constitutional 
Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 484–86 (2018). 
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Given these features of the contemporary constitutional regime in the 
United States, and because the battle is at a point at which it is not yet clear 
who holds the upper hand, it is not at all obvious why playing defense in the 
ways previously described is the right course of action.  Playing defense in 
this way by the one side that is potentially more poised for restraining itself310 
seems like unjustified “unilateral disarmament.”311  The case for a defensive 
play seems furthermore based on a too static perspective of politics.  Though 
it may be true that in the current composition of political parties in the United 
States, the likelihood of continual cycles of “tit-for-tat”—and the ultimate 
exhaustion of valuable norms—seem plausible,312 it is also possible that 
changes pursued by norm-shattering behavior may alter those compositions, 
in ways that complicate the endless tit-for-tat account.  
As a result, a more appropriate response in the circumstances that exist 
in the United States is exactly the opposite: to play offense, not defense. In 
other words, to engage in active breaking of norms in response to the norm-
breaking of the other side. 
Of course, following this offensive path has obvious risks, and the stakes 
are also quite high. As a result, it makes sense to ask whether there is anything 
to do to minimize the risks associated with norm-shattering behavior?  
The answer seems to be not much but perhaps something.  In the usual 
state of affairs, when intra-liberal political transitions occur, there are 
sufficient incentives after the stabilization of the new political regime to 
revert to valuable norms related to political fair play and other process 
norms.313  But it might be advisable to consider ways to strengthen that 
tendency and supplement whatever existing incentives the end-of-regime 
transitions might create.   
In the context of constitutional emergencies, we are familiar with the 
concerns revolving a ratchet effect.314  In the world of transitional justice, 
though the dominant framework usually warns that “[t]hose who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it”315 and the oft-adopted slogan 
is accordingly “forgive but do not forget,” some voices insist on a different 
 
 310. See generally Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 16.  
 311. See Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Court, TAKE CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court; Tushnet, supra 
note 265. 
 312. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 209; Feldman, supra note 198.  
 313. See generally Weingast supra note 85. 
 314. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 44 (2006).  
 315. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE: THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905); 
see also Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1998). 
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stance.  These alternative voices emphasize the virtue not of remembering 
but of forgetting so a promising “fresh start” can be made.316  Borrowing from 
these ideas, we may therefore understand our contemporary projects in 
countries such as the United States as ones involving avoiding ratcheting 
down (as in constitutional emergencies), preemptively forgetting (as in 
transitional justice), or—more congenial to the terms used in Part III—
engaging in preemptive memory entrepreneuring whose goals is to decrease 
the likelihood that current behaviors will guide future behavior and serve as 
relevant political precedents even after the period of political transition will 
end. 
To be sure, achieving this preemptive forgetting in expectation of the 
future and the end of transition time is a complex task.  It will require using 
appropriate rhetoric and narratives that will allow a schizophrenic reality of 
norm-shattering behavior but that will simultaneously negate that behavior 
(by, for instance, suggesting that “[t]his is not [us]”).317  It is an act of 
“strategic forgetting.”318   
Though complicated,319 this seems, as of now, like the task ahead both 
in the contemporary United States and in other countries currently facing 
similar types of political transitions.  
* * * 
The conclusions from this Part can be summarized as follows: 
 
 316. See NELSON MANDELA, THE STRUGGLE IS MY LIFE 210 (1978) (describing reconciliation 
as a goal to be achieved “where the injustices and grievances of the past would be buried and 
forgotten, and a fresh start made”); see also DAVID RIEFF, IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING: HISTORICAL 
MEMORY AND ITS IRONIES (2017).  It should be noted that later in his life, Nelson Mandela seems 
to have retreated from this early view about the desirability of forgiveness accompanied by 
forgiveness.  See https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jul/03/guardianreview.books7.  
 317. See, e.g., Stephen Collinson & Caitlin Hu, This Is Not America, CNNWORLD (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/07/world/meanwhile-in-america-january-7-intl/index.html.  For an 
example of such use in the specific context of constitutional norms, see Richard Primus, Rulebooks, 
Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-
and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/ (criticizing a 
suggestion for expanding and appointing lower court judges to eradicate the legacy of President 
Obama’s judicial appointments as reminiscent of a deeply unattractive political past).  Compare 
David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft Power Administrative Law: The Case of Medicaid Eligibility 
Waivers, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590, 1590 (2018) (framing the present moment as “hiatus in consensus 
for good-faith decisionmaking”). 
 318. See Pablo Martin de Holan & Nelson Phillips, Organizational Forgetting as Strategy, 2 
STRATEGIC ORG. 423, 430 (2004); Pablo Martin de Holan & Nelson Phillips, Remembrance of 
Things Past? The Dynamics of Organizational Forgetting, 50 MGMT. SCI. 1603 (2014). 
 319. In addition to the sources cited in note 315, an illuminating discussion and application of 
psychoanalysis to constitutionalism, on which such an attempt—as my use of the term “negation” 
suggests—could draw, see MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY (2010).  
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Table 4: Two Strategies for Defending Norms in Times of 
Constitutional Retrogression 
 
 The Key Work When Is It Appealing 
Playing Defense 1. Adhering to present 
norms 
2. Rhetoric of 
containment—biting the 
bullet and trying to “count-
in” norm breaches 
1. Incentives for restraint 
2. Risks of constitutional 
retrogression are high 
Playing Offense Actively breaking norms 
(and, as a precaution, to 
accompany the breaking 
with denial that breaking 
instances are precedential, 
including “this is not us” 
rhetoric) 
1. No incentives for restraint 
(or asymmetrical incentives) 
2. Risks of constitutional 
retrogression are low (intra-
liberal transitions) 
CONCLUSION: MATURE LAW AS PRIMITIVE LAW? 
My goal in this Article was to demonstrate that constitutional norms, 
despite being what we may describe, following H.L.A. Hart, as primitive 
components of our political systems, can mature or grow up, in the sense that 
we can better understand how they change and how they are adjudicated in 
politics.  As the various Parts of this Article detailed, constitutional norms—
when fully crystalized—will likely not burst like bubbles but rather gradually 
evolve to either become different or to disappear entirely.  The process of 
constitutional norms’ evolution can also be theorized more crisply by 
identifying five distinct mechanisms that cause norms to change: layering, 
drift, conversion, displacement, and exhaustion.  These are what this Article 
described as rules of change for norms.   
The Article also emphasized the pragmatic value of the discussion by 
outlining the strategies that constitutional norm entrepreneurs and 
constitutional norm anti-preneurs can use to change present norms or 
safeguard them.  These are what this Article described as constitutional 
norms’ rules of adjudication.  Finally, given the current moment we live in 
in which some valuable constitutional norms appear especially fragile and 
highlight the potential risks of democratic decline or constitutional 
retrogression, the Article outlined two different strategies of defending 
norms—playing defense and playing offense. And it argued that at least as 
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things stand today, the latter strategy is likely more appropriate for the United 
States . 
The discussion in the Article has focused squarely on constitutional 
norms (and in several respects on norms more generally) as informal 
institutions within our politics.  At this point, though, it seems worth noting 
briefly that the discussion can also illuminate some important features of the 
formal institution of law. 
From one perspective, this is not surprising, even obvious.  The 
mechanisms of change I relied on in this Article originate from scholarship 
that addresses formal institutions.  It is therefore clear why these mechanisms 
are easily exportable to law as one type of formal institution.  Accordingly, 
much as norms can be changed through layering, conversion, drift, 
displacement, and exhaustion, so too can formal laws change in this way.320  
From a different perspective, however, the implications of this Article’s 
framework for formal, standard law run deeper than what first meets the eye.  
Any formal institution inevitably contains informal features that supplement 
and interact with its formal components.  The various norms that regulate our 
constitutional politics, and that are the focus of this Article, continue to 
operate alongside formal law.  But this does not exhaust the entire spectrum 
of relevant norms.  Some informal norms regulate our constitutional politics. 
But some norms regulate the institutions of formal law themselves.  And as 
much as the framework developed in this Article applies to the former, so too 
does it apply to the latter.  
An easy example of this is stare decisis.  More than anything, stare 
decisis seems like an informal norm about how judges in top courts in 
common law systems should treat prior rulings with respect and constraint.321  
In the United States, and at the level of the Supreme Court, many believe that 
 
 320. The primary import of this is that formal law does not only change in direct ways, such as 
when a piece of legislation is repealed or a precedent overruled.  Formal law can change, certainly 
in a de facto sense, in the various ways that the evolutionary mechanisms of institutional change 
point to: by layering the statute with additional provisions (or by creating exceptions to the judicial 
precedent), by reinterpreting and repurposing the relevant statute (or precedents), and so forth.  We 
have seen this in the examples of the Sherman Act and the FOIA framework discussed in Part II 
supra.  Another relevant import is that lawmakers or judges who are unhappy about the prospect of 
change in this way need not remain passive.  They can instead engage in all the practices that norm 
anti-preneurs can use and that are described in Part IV, including counter-layering, politics of 
fidelity, politics of unfreezing, demonizing and valorizing, and so forth.  In my view, this explains 
much of what occurs today in the judicial “attack” on the administrative state—where the judiciary 
seems to be working through subversive layering to change the body of law that supports the 
existing administrative state and those who resist that attempt engage in many of the tactics norm 
anti-preneurs utilize.  See generally Metzger, supra note 218. 
 321. See, e.g., Young, supra note 56, at 565. I deal with this issue in a separate piece. See 
generally Oren Tamir, Political Stare Decisis, 22 CHI. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming, 2021) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3712418.  
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the norm of stare decisis has become extremely weak and is on the verge of 
impotence.322  The framework fleshed out here can accordingly help explain 
why and how this happened.  What it illustrates is that the norm of stare 
decisis has been consistently exhausted given that judges have continually 
disregarded it and proved its disutility , essentially  demonstrating that they 
are willing to disregard past rulings and pursue the substantive results they 
deem more attractive rather than be constrained.  Alternatively, the norm of 
stare decisis experienced at the Supreme Court level a significant, perhaps 
overwhelming, process of layering—the accumulation of exceptions upon 
exceptions.  That layering has ultimately transformed stare decisis from a 
norm about respecting precedents to one that limits judges from overriding 
past decisions too frequently—or, more cynically, to nothing more than 
rhetoric rather than genuine constraint. 
But even this specific example does not yet capture the full story about 
the Article’s potential to tell us valuable things about formal, ordinary law.  
The reason is that informal norms affect formal legal decision-making in 
even more subtle and meaningful ways.  First, the practices of legal 
argumentation are themselves importantly regulated by norms, those second-
order norms that apply broadly in the legal profession.323  Second, norms 
always stand in the background of the various substantive fields of law and 
provide specific lenses or paradigms, or constitute a relevant gestalt, that 
determine the scope of permissible contestation in those fields.324  In that 
sense, understanding how norms change, develop, and are “adjudicated” has 
a much wider import.  Doing so can provide us the tools to appreciate how 
formal law itself really is changed in a deeper sense, including how issues 
that had been perceived as “off the wall” began to look as if they are “on the 
 
 322. .Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 SUP. 
CT. REV. 121, 143 (2018).  
 323. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword, Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) 
(“Judges and lawyers subscribe to an elaborate network of craft norms.  Acquired through 
professional training and experience, these norms generate a high degree of convergence . . . on 
what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 88 (2018) (“American constitutional law is a practice in this sense, constituted by 
the shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the constitutional order 
and participate in constitutional argument and adjudicative practices.”); Frederick Schauer, 
Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1957 (2008) (“[T]he recognition and non-
recognition of law and legal sources is better understood as a practice in the Wittgensteinian sense: 
a practice in which lawyers, judges, commentators, and other legal actors gradually and in diffuse 
fashion determine what will count as a legitimate source—and thus what will count as law.”). 
 324. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
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wall”325 and how more fundamental shifts in legal regimes are achieved.  In 
a nutshell, very much like other norms, these norms that apply in law also 
change not only given the merits of the claims individual players are pursuing 
through the law, but also through the working of the various mechanisms of 
layering, drift, conversion, displacement, and exhaustion within the 
institutions of formal law and through the sophisticated play of norm 
entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs. 
H.L.A. Hart, whose name has constantly appeared throughout this 
Article, famously argued that at its basis, law is just a set of what we now 
understand as informal norms that legal officials have internalized—and that 
serve, in his terminology, as the “ultimate rule of recognition.”326  If Hart was 
right—and perhaps ironically—making primitive law less primitive in the 
various ways I have suggested in this Article, may very well be the key to 
unlocking much of mature, formal law. 
 
 325. See Jack Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went 
Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/ 
from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/.  
 326. See HART, supra note 25, at 89–91.  For a clarifying discussion of Hart’s thought on this 
point, see Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523 (2013). 
